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Crafting Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for 
Patent Assertion Entities, Litigation, and Innovation†
By Josh Feng and Xavier Jaravel*
We show that  examiner-driven variation in patent rights leads to quan-
titatively large impacts on several patent outcomes, including patent 
value, citations, and litigation. Notably, Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs) overwhelmingly purchase patents granted by “lenient” exam-
iners. These examiners issue patents that are more likely to be liti-
gated by both PAEs and conventional companies, and that also have 
higher invalidity rates. PAEs leverage a specific friction in the patent 
system that stems from lenient examiners and affects litigation more 
broadly. These patterns indicate that there is much at stake during 
patent examination, contradicting the influential “rational ignorance” 
view of the patent office. (JEL K11, K41, O31, O34, O38)
Which features of the patent system matter for innovation dynamics? In this paper, we investigate the behaviors of examiners at the United States 
Patent Office (USPTO) and their impact on various patent outcomes. We find that 
 examiner-driven variation in patent rights is central to understand a  much-debated 
feature of the US innovation system: the activities of Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs). PAEs, which acquire patents from third parties and generate revenue by 
asserting them against alleged infringers, are controversial as they account for a 
large share of patent licensing and lawsuits.1 We show that PAEs disproportion-
ately purchase and assert patents from “lenient” patent examiners who issue patents 
that are more likely to be litigated and legally invalid. Furthermore, we find that 
1 For instance, RPX Corporation (2015) reports that the share of PAEs in overall patent lawsuits went from 
35 percent in 2010 to 70 percent in 2015, while Federal Trade Commission (2016) documents that the share of PAE 
in licensing revenue was 80 percent in the wireless chipset sector between 2009–2014. 
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 examiners have an impact on several important patent outcomes (conditional on 
patent grant), including patent value and citations.
We advance the hypothesis that these examiner effects primarily stem from the 
way examiners craft patents rather than from their choice of which patents to grant. 
Conceptually, the value of a patent may not be solely determined by the quality 
of the idea embedded in it: a patent is not a raw idea but a  carefully worded legal 
document, conferring to its holder the right to sue for infringement.2 Examiners are 
heavily involved in the process of writing the patent description and claims through 
a  back-and-forth process with the applicant between patent filing and patent grant 
(known as the “prosecution” process).
Using detailed data from the prosecution process, we find empirical support for 
the hypothesis that patent crafting matters for many patent outcomes, particularly 
so for litigation and PAEs. We show that patent outcomes correlate with specific 
examiner traits (e.g., the propensity to change the text of the claims during prosecu-
tion), and we use flexible controls to address the potential concern that our results 
are driven by selection effects stemming from the decision of which patents to grant 
(rather than by the way patents are crafted). The finding that PAEs overwhelm-
ingly purchase patents granted by lenient examiners cannot be accounted for by 
mainstream theories of PAEs (which emphasize efficient intermediation or nuisance 
litigation). Instead, this pattern suggests that PAEs are primarily the symptom of a 
specific friction in the patent system, the way patent rights are crafted by lenient 
examiners. This friction affects litigation more broadly.
The first part of the paper examines the importance of examiners for various pat-
ent outcomes. Examiners decide which patents to grant and, conditional on grant, 
affect patent rights rather than the underlying idea embedded in the patent. By law, 
all examiners must ensure that the patents they grant have clear,  well-defined claims 
with appropriate scope. In practice, using prosecution data from the USPTO and 
Frakes and Wasserman (2017), we find that there is significant variation in the way 
examiners craft patent rights. Conditional on patent grant, examiner effects may 
therefore be interpreted as reflecting variation in patent rights that is orthogonal to 
other determinants of patent outcomes, such as technical merit (we discuss below 
how this interpretation hinges on the ability to control for potential differences in the 
underlying quality of examiners’ granted patents).
We contribute to a growing literature (e.g., Sampat and Williams 2015; Gaulé 
2015; and  Farre-Mensa, Hegde, and Ljungqvist 2017) suggesting that patent appli-
cations can be treated as  quasi-randomly allocated to examiners conditional on 
some covariates like application, year, and technology class.3 Prior research has 
used examiner assignment to estimate the causal effects of obtaining a patent, as 
2 A striking feature of patent systems around the world is the enormous variation in private returns, social returns, 
and litigation risk across patents (e.g., Pakes 1986 and Kogan et al. 2017 on firm returns; Toivanen and Väänänen 
2012 and Bell et al. 2017 on inventor returns; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993 on patent citations as a proxy 
for social value; and Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001 on exposure to litigation). Scientific or technical factors, such 
as the expertise of eminent scientists (e.g., Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang 2010) or a firm’s learning capacity (e.g., 
Cohen and Levinthal 1989), are likely to be important drivers of patent outcomes. But the way patents are crafted 
may also be important, which we examine in this paper.
3 Conceptually, patent outcomes may vary because of heterogeneity in idea quality, the applicant’s input into patent 
drafting (typically via the applicant’s lawyers), and the examiner’s input into patent drafting. We use variation in patent 
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examiners differ in their grant rates. We build on this approach but differ in two 
ways. First, we develop two new  quasi-experimental approaches to address identi-
fication concerns about examiner specialization raised in more recent work (Righi 
and Simcoe 2017); second, we exploit variation in examiner prosecution behavior 
conditional on granting the patent rather than variation in the propensity of exam-
iners to grant patents. We present evidence supporting the validity of our approach 
after reporting a set of baseline results.
Our baseline research design estimates examiner fixed effects on the set of 
granted patents conditional on  technology-by-year fixed effects. Our estimator uses 
an empirical Bayes shrinkage correction to prevent “overfitting” of the fixed effects, 
which would misattribute some of the variation from noise to causal variation across 
examiners. We apply this methodology to a range of patent outcomes related to pri-
vate returns (stock market response from Kogan et al. 2017 and payment of main-
tenance fees), patent citations (total citations, self-citations, and external citations), 
patent market dynamics (patent sales, in general and specifically to PAEs), and legal 
disputes (patent infringement lawsuits, in general and specifically from PAEs). The 
estimated examiner effects are large for many outcomes, in particular for those 
related to PAEs and litigation. For example, a one standard deviation change in 
examiner effects leads stock market capitalization to increase by $3 million, total 
citations by 24 percent, patent purchases by PAEs by 63 percent, litigation by 64 
percent, and litigation specifically by PAEs by 46 percent. These estimates imply 
that policies affecting examiner behavior can have a substantial impact on the US 
innovation system.4
We then validate the causal interpretation and magnitudes of our baseline esti-
mates in three ways. First, regarding identification, Righi and  Simcoe (2017) 
reports strong evidence that examiners working in the same  technology-based 
group (called “art units”)5 in fact specialize in specific  sub-technologies, in ways 
that may be difficult to control for using observables. We develop two complemen-
tary  quasi-experimental approaches to address this concern: (i) we show that there 
is a large subset of art units within which patent applications are assigned to exam-
iners based on the last digit of the application’s serial number, implying that exam-
iner assignment is orthogonal to potential confounds in these art units; and (ii) we 
show that an examiner’s “busyness” can be used as an instrument for application 
assignment; examiners with recently disposed applications are much more likely to 
be assigned the next incoming application, which provides variation in assignment 
drafting from examiners rather than from lawyers because examiners are  quasi-randomly assigned to patents, while 
lawyer assignment may be correlated with idea quality across applicants. 
4 As a point of comparison, the teacher  value-added literature has documented sizable but much smaller effects 
of teachers on student outcomes. Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014a, b) estimates that a one standard deviation 
improvement in teacher effects in one grade raises student earnings by about 1 percent at age 28.
5 Examiners at the USPTO are divided into more than 600 working groups called “art units,” each composed of 
about 20 examiners who handle patent applications on relatively homogeneous technologies. Following qualitative 
evidence on assignment of applications to examiners reported in Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern (2003); Lemley 
and Sampat (2010); and Lemley and Sampat (2012), the recent literature treats assignment of patent applications 
to examiners within the same art unit as “as good as random” (e.g., Sampat and Williams 2015; Gaulé 2015; and 
 Farre-Mensa, Hegde, and Ljungqvist 2017). 
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even in art units with significant specialization. These two alternative sources of 
variation yield estimates that are similar to our baseline results.
Second, we address the potential concern that selection effects (from the patent 
grant decision) may confound our results. Since examiners differ in their grant rates, 
it could be the case that patent outcomes vary across examiners because of under-
lying differences across examiners’ pools of granted patents, independently of the 
crafting of patent rights. For instance, examiners with a low grant rate might only 
grant patents of high technical merit; this examiner “selection effect” is not related 
to patent crafting. To assess the magnitude of this potential bias, we introduce flex-
ible controls for the examiner’s average grant rate as well as proxies for the techni-
cal merit of patent applications (including the number of claims and the patenting 
histories of the assignee and inventors). We find that there is equally large causal 
variation in patent outcomes across examiners with these additional controls, which 
suggests that our estimates do not capture selection effects from grant decisions.
Third, we validate our baseline estimates in  out-of-sample tests. We find that the 
empirical Bayes shrinkage correction is important to suitably account for excess 
variance from noise and obtain unbiased estimates of examiner effects, in particular 
for rare outcomes such as PAE purchase and litigation.
In the second part of the analysis, we investigate why examiner effects are an 
important driver of the wave of patent purchases and lawsuits by PAEs, a major and 
controversial feature of the US innovation system. We focus on outcomes related 
to PAEs because they rank among the outcomes that are most sensitive to examiner 
effects, and because PAEs have generated substantial academic and policy debate.6 
There are two main hypotheses about PAEs’ behaviors: (i) PAEs may be useful 
intermediaries in the patent market, fostering incentives to innovate by lowering the 
cost of matching patent holders to patent buyers (e.g., Hagiu and Yoffie 2013 and 
Abrams et al. 2019) and helping enforce the patents of small inventors who lack the 
financial resources or legal expertise to defend themselves against large infringing 
companies (e.g., Lu 2012 and Galetovic, Haber, and Levine 2015); or (ii) PAEs may 
exploit imperfections in the legal system by acquiring patents with unclear claim 
boundaries and by asking innovative firms for licensing fees, whether or not the 
asserted patent is valid or infringed, in the hope that targeted firms will settle instead 
of risking a costly and uncertain trial (e.g., Miller 2013; Council of Economic 
Advisers 2013; Cohen, Gurun, and Kominers 2016; and Federal Trade Commission 
2016). Any plausible theory of PAEs should account for the new fact, documented 
in the first part of this paper, regarding the large sensitivity of PAEs to examiner 
effects. By analyzing which examiners drive patent acquisition and litigation by 
PAEs, we can assess which PAE theories are plausible.
6 PAEs, also known as “ nonpracticing entities,” “patent monetization entities,” or “patent trolls,” are defined as 
entities that generate revenue exclusively from patent licensing and litigation, without producing or selling products 
(Federal Trade Commission 2016). Since there is no official list of PAEs, we follow the literature (e.g., Bessen 
and Meurer 2014) and rely on a list provided by the RPX Corporation, a firm that helps companies manage risks 
from exposure to patent litigation. Universities, individual inventors, and failed companies are excluded from the 
set of PAEs we consider, and we show that the results are similar with alternative PAE lists from Cotropia, Kesan, 
and Schwartz (2014).
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We start by studying the characteristics of examiners who issue patents that are 
purchased and asserted by PAEs or practicing firms. We correlate the causal exam-
iner effects from the first part of the paper with measures of examiners’ prosecution 
behaviors based on the correspondence between examiners and applicants (from 
Frakes and Wasserman 2017). We find that within the same technology category, 
PAEs and practicing firms target patents issued by examiners with different charac-
teristics.7 PAEs disproportionately purchase and assert patents that were granted by 
“lenient” examiners, who require applicants to make fewer changes to the text of 
the patent, such as clarifying a claim or withdrawing a claim deemed to be obvious 
or to bear on non-patentable subject matter. Examiner leniency has a negligible 
correlation with purchases by practicing firms, a sizable correlation with litigation 
by practicing firms and on purchases by PAEs, and a much larger correlation with 
litigation by PAEs. These patterns are quantitatively important: for instance, a one 
standard deviation increase in a simple proxy for examiner leniency, the change in 
the number of words per claim between patent filing and grant, leads to an increase 
in litigation of 40.5 percent for PAEs and 13.9 percent for practicing firms. These 
results cannot be accounted for by theories of PAEs based on a generic friction in 
the patent market, such as matching costs or the lack of financial resources for some 
inventors. They are consistent with the view that PAEs have a comparative advan-
tage in patent litigation and therefore handle patents that are subject to a higher 
litigation risk, induced by the way examiners handle patents during prosecution. 
The fact that examiner leniency is an important driver of litigation for both PAEs 
and practicing firms, although the effect is not as large for the latter, is in line with 
a nuanced view of PAEs (e.g., Lemley and Melamed 2013 and Schwartz and Kesan 
2014). According to this view, PAEs do not exploit imperfections of the legal system 
in an idiosyncratic way, but behave as litigation experts. In sum, our results show 
that PAEs’ activities are the symptom of the way patents are handled by lenient 
examiners who affect litigation more broadly.
Given the evidence that patent litigation by PAEs is strongly correlated with 
examiner leniency, we study whether lenient examiners tend to issue patents that 
are more likely to be invalid according to the standards set by current patent law. 
Several observers have hypothesized that PAEs assert invalid patents (e.g., Federal 
Trade Commission 2016); approaching this question in terms of examiner effects 
has the potential to be informative about PAEs but also about patent litigation by 
practicing firms, who also selectively assert patents that were issued by lenient 
examiners. Patent invalidity is notoriously difficult to measure because of selec-
tion effects. For instance, court rulings on patent validity are observed only for a 
strongly selected set of patents, as there were only a few hundred rulings over the 
past decade. To address this issue, we introduce a proxy for patent invalidity avail-
able in the full sample of granted patents: patent  re-issuance requests, which can 
7 Given that  quasi-random assignment is at the level of examiners, the only causal effect that can be recovered is 
the “full” examiner effect on patent outcomes, which is a bundle of observed and unobserved examiner attributes. 
Observed relationships between patent outcomes and specific examiner attributes can only be interpreted as correla-
tions, which are potentially subject to omitted variable bias. As discussed in Section III, we focus on establishing 
correlations that are quantitatively large, robust to the inclusion of various controls, and that can be interpreted as 
reflecting a more general trait of the examiner, such as “leniency.”
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be filed by the applicant when a patent is deemed wholly or partly “inoperative or 
invalid” through an error in the document. Using this proxy as well as two common 
proxies for invalidity (decisions from court rulings and trials at the patent office), we 
document robust and quantitatively important evidence that lenient examiners issue 
patents that are more likely to be invalid. The evidence is therefore consistent with 
the view that PAEs are willing to purchase and assert patents for which validity is 
questionable, but PAEs are not the only entities to assert such patents—practicing 
firms do so as well.8
These results are surprising for several reasons. First, the very large impact of 
patent examiners on patent outcomes (conditional on grant) is unexpected. While 
previous work documented variation in examiners’ propensities to grant patents 
(Sampat and Williams 2015; Gaulé 2015; and  Farre-Mensa, Hegde, and Ljungqvist 
2017), we uncover the importance of the “intensive margin” of examiner effects 
(the crafting of patent rights, conditional on patent grant). This margin was not 
previously thought of as being of paramount importance for patent outcomes, 
as evidenced by (i) the fact that patent examiners are not very well paid,9 (ii) 
the influential “rational ignorance” view of the patent office (Lemley 2000) that 
states there is little at stake in the patent examination process and that  low-quality 
patents can be rationally ignored without significant consequences, and (iii) the 
focus of innovation research on the “ macro-determinants” of the patent system, 
such as laws that establish a patent system or change the set of patentable subject 
matters.10 In contrast, we show the importance of the “ micro-determinants” of 
patents by establishing that the specific way in which patent rights are crafted (by 
examiners who are all subject to the same patent law) has a substantial impact on 
a range of patent outcomes and is of  first-order importance to understand certain 
features of the US innovation system, such as litigation (by PAEs in particular, 
but also by practicing firms). Additionally, our results on PAEs and litigation are 
also unexpected: (i) our finding that PAEs overwhelmingly purchase and assert 
patents from lenient examiners is not in line with mainstream theories of PAEs;11 
(ii) our findings imply that policies affecting examiner behavior could have a large 
impact on PAEs’ activities and litigation (in contrast with prior work that does not 
use  quasi-experimental variation, e.g., Marco and  Miller 2019);12 and (iii) the 
8 This finding does not speak conclusively to the welfare effects of PAEs because litigation of patents issued by 
lenient examiners could conceivably be socially valuable, even when these patents are deemed invalid by the courts, 
the USPTO, or applicants themselves. For instance, Galetovic, Haber, and Levine (2015) suggests that the process 
of litigation might be the  socially efficient dynamic process through which the patent system defines the contours 
of what should be patentable in  highly innovative, rapidly changing industries.
9 In 2017, most patent examiners started with annual salaries between $54,099–82,094; salary can reach around 
$130,000 for senior patent examiners, which is much lower than the typical salary of patent lawyers.
10 For theoretical contributions, see, for example, Nordhaus (1969), Klemperer (1990), and Gilbert and Shapiro 
(1990); for empirical studies, see, for example, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), Moser (2005), Lerner (2009), and 
Williams (2013).
11 For recent work on PAEs, see, for example, Golden (2006); McDonough III (2006); Chien (2012); Tucker 
(2014); Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz (2018); and Haber and Werfel (2016).
12 Our findings are also related to the pioneering study of Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern (2003), which docu-
ments relationships between some examiner characteristics and patent invalidity rulings. We show how to recover 
the full magnitude of examiner effects on patent outcomes using a fixed effects estimator with a Bayesian shrinkage 
correction. 
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examiners who drive PAEs’ activities do not tend to create greater private value in 
general, as discussed in Section III.13
Our findings about PAEs should be placed in the context of recent patent reforms 
(e.g., inter partes reviews) and Supreme Court rulings (e.g., eBay v. MercExchange, 
Alice v. CLS Bank). The 27 percent fall in the number of defendants targeted by 
PAEs from 2016 to 2017 suggests that this new legislation may be curbing PAEs’ 
activities. Despite this change, PAEs remain a pressing potential social concern; 
PAE-targeted firms still account for 56 percent of all defendants in intellectual prop-
erty (IP) cases, and PAEs are also active beyond litigation (e.g., licensing). Our 
results suggest that policies affecting patents examiners are another potentially pow-
erful policy lever to affect their activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the data 
and descriptive statistics. Section II estimates examiner effects on a range of pat-
ent outcomes. Section III studies the implications for PAEs’ activities. Section IV 
concludes.
I. Data
In this section, we describe the data sources, define the samples and key variables 
we used in the analysis, and present summary statistics.
A. Data Sources, Samples, and Variable Definitions
Patent Records.—We use two types of patent data to achieve two purposes. First, 
we rely on data on granted patents to measure a series of  post-grant patent outcomes. 
Specifically, we build proxies for the private returns to patents, identify  high-impact 
patents using citations, and document transactions in the patent market. Second, we 
use data on both granted and ungranted patent applications to identify examiners 
and measure their behavior during patent prosecution.
The granted patent dataset is obtained from USPTO and extends from 1975 to 
2016.14 We rely on several proxies for the private returns to patents. Following the 
literature (e.g., Pakes 1986), we use the payment of patent maintenance fees as a 
lower bound on the private valuation of the patent by the assignee. These fees are 
due 4, 8, and 12 years after patent grant and are increasing over time.15 We also 
use the estimates of  firm-level returns to patents from Kogan et  al. (2017), who 
runs event studies to estimate the excess stock market return realized on the grant 
date of patents assigned to  publicly traded firms; these estimates are available for 
patents granted before 2010. Moreover, we use data on patent citations to identify 
 high-impact patents. We consider alternatively total citations, self-citations (i.e., the 
assignee of the focal patent cites it in future patents), and citations by assignees 
13 Therefore, it is not the case that examiners with high PAE effects create more valuable patents for all agents 
in the patent system, as would be the case if they were just allowing greater scope.
14 This data is obtained through the Reed Tech USPTO page: http://patents.reedtech.com/pgrbft.php.
15 For entities that do not benefit from reduced rates, the fees are $1,600 after 4 years, $3,600 after 8 years, 
and $7,400 after 12 years. The complete fee schedule is available from the USPTO at https://www.uspto.
gov/ learning-and-resources/ fees-and-payment/ uspto-fee-schedule.
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that were not listed on the focal patent. We build these measures using the disam-
biguated assignee names from Balsmeier et al. (2015). To address censoring, we 
focus on citations that occurred in the three years following patent grant, and we 
 document in robustness checks that the results are similar when considering all cita-
tions. Finally, we measure changes in ownership of patents by merging in data on 
patent  reassignments from Graham, Marco, and Myers (2018).16
The data covering both granted and ungranted patent applications ranges from 
2001 to 2015 and is obtained from the USPTO’s Patent Examination Research 
Dataset (Graham, Marco, and Miller 2015a). We use this dataset to obtain unique 
numeric identifiers for each examiner during their tenure at the patent office, which 
are the critical inputs needed to estimate examiner effects. We then merge in data 
from Frakes and Wasserman (2017) on the correspondence between the examiner 
and the applicant. When asking applicants to amend patent documents, examiners 
need to ground their demands in specific sections of patent law, which we describe 
in Section IB.17 To characterize an examiner’s behavior during prosecution, we 
count the number of references made to the various sections of patent law. We also 
measure the examiner’s grant rate, and, for granted patents, we directly measure 
the extent to which the text of the patent changes between application and grant by 
computing changes in the number of words per claim and in the number of claims.18
Our main analysis sample is the Patent Examination Research Dataset merged to 
the patent outcomes of the granted patent dataset. We implement one important sam-
ple restriction: we exclude the  so-called “continuation applications,” applications 
that follow an  earlier-filed patent application. Those applications are assigned to the 
same examiner as the patent they follow, and, therefore,  quasi-random assignment 
of examiner does not hold. Our main analysis sample covers each  non-continuation 
granted patent between 2001 and 2015, for which we observe the patent outcomes 
of interest as well as examiners’ identity and prosecution behaviors. For robust-
ness, we estimate examiner effects on the full sample of ( non-continuation) granted 
patents going back to 1975 by disambiguating examiner names (given the lack of 
numeric identifiers in this sample), but we lose information on examiners’ prosecu-
tion behaviors.
Patent Litigation.—We combine three data sources to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of patent litigation. Specifically, we combine data from LexMachina, Darts 
IP, and RPX, which have been tracking intellectual property lawsuits since 2000 and 
16 Records of the assignments (transactions) affecting US patents are maintained by the US Patent and 
Trademark Office and available between 1970 and 2014. There is no express legal requirement for parties to dis-
close assignments to the USPTO, but patent laws provide incentives for recording. For instance, failure to record 
an assignment renders it void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee (35 USC 261). See Graham, Marco, 
and Meyers (2015b) for more details.
17 When a patent is assigned to two examiners, a “primary” examiner with signatory authority and a “second-
ary” examiner who carries out most of the work, we treat the data as if the patent had been assigned to the secondary 
examiner only, following the example of Lemley and Sampat (2012).
18 The USPTO’s Patent Examination Research Dataset only covers published patent applications. For ungranted 
patents, applicants are free to opt out of publications, which occurs in about 5 percent of cases during the period 
we consider (Graham, Marco, and Meyers 2018). The potential selectivity issues that could arise from the omission 
of  “nonpublic” applications are largely orthogonal to our analysis, as we only rely on ungranted applications to 
measure an examiner’s allowance rate. 
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thus offer full coverage for our main analysis sample. Although the datasets have 
significant overlap, it is sometimes challenging to identify all the patents involved in 
a given lawsuit, which creates differences in the lists.19
Patent Assertion Entities.—Following standard practice (e.g., Bessen and Meurer 
2014), we rely on a list provided by the RPX Corporation, a firm that helps compa-
nies manage litigation risk, and exclude from the list any individual inventor, univer-
sity, or failed company.20 We then build the patent portfolio of PAEs by merging the 
PAE list to the patent  reassignment dataset of Graham, Marco, and Myers (2018) by 
assignee name. We only consider patents that were purchased by PAEs (a few large 
PAEs, such as Intellectual Ventures, also invent their own patents). To establish that 
our results are robust to the choice of PAE list, we repeat the analysis using alter-
native PAE lists from Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz (2014) and consider only the 
patent portfolio of Intellectual Ventures.21
B. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest, documenting 
heterogeneity in patent outcomes (panel A), the extent to which patent documents 
change between application and grant (panel B), and heterogeneity in examiner 
behavior (panel C).
Statistics on private returns, citations, patent sales, and patent litigation are 
shown in panel A of Table 1. Private returns feature high variance; the standard 
deviation of the  firm-level patent value estimates from Kogan et al. (2017) is equal 
to almost three times the mean. The rates of maintenance fee payments are very 
high in early years but substantially lower for the more expensive twelfth-year 
maintenance fee payment, which also indicates heterogeneity in private valuations. 
Citations also feature high variance, indicating that patents greatly vary in their 
level of impact, regardless of whether we consider total citations,  self-citations, 
or citations by other assignees. The panel also shows that about 20 percent of all 
granted patents are sold to practicing (i.e.,  non-PAEs) firms and 1.01 percent to 
PAEs. Only 0.65 percent of all granted patents are litigated. Patent litigation by 
PAEs involves 0.04 percent of patents; this fraction is very small, but it indicates 
that PAEs’ litigation rate is over six times higher than average, given that they own 
only about 1 percent of the patent stock.22 The purpose of Section II is to estimate 
the extent to which this heterogeneity in patent outcomes results from examiner 
effects.
Panel B of Table 1 shows how the patent document changes between application 
and grant. In most cases, the examiner issues a  so-called “rejection” as her first 
decision on the application (Williams 2017), which is effectively an  invitation for 
19 We manually checked a few of the differences and verified that the patents were actually involved in litigation.
20 Excluded entities are based on classifications from RPX and Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz (2014).
21 Intellectual Ventures holds an estimated  25,000–30,000 US patents and released a list of around 20,000 pat-
ents on their website in November 2013 that is available at http://patents.intven.com/data/ivpatents.csv.
22 In addition, PAE patents are involved in about seven cases per litigated patent versus about two cases for 
 non-PAE litigated patents, based on a simple count of district court cases per patent in the LexMachina data. 
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the patent applicant (or their representative, typically a patent attorney) to revise 
the text of the patent. Panel B shows that these changes are substantial. Through 
the  back-and-forth with the examiner, the number of words in each claim increases 
by 57 percent on average.23 The lengthening of the claims can be interpreted as 
limiting the scope and clarifying the claims by making them more precise (Marco, 
Sarnoff, and deGrazia 2016). In addition, examiners tend to ask applicants to reduce 
the number of claims to limit the scope of the patent; while the average change 
is limited (−3.64 percent), the standard deviation across patents is high (46.14 
percent).24 We also observe that the examiner asks the applicant to add citations 
to prior patents. The changes to the patent document during the  back-and-forth 
between the  applicant and the examiner show that the examiner is engaged in an 
23 Given that the effective IP protection provided by a patent depends entirely on the content of the claims, and 
given that examiners affect to a great extent the words in the claims during prosecution, it is plausible that examiners 
may have a large impact on the legal force of the patent.
24 Following the literature, we report statistics for independent claims, leaving dependent claims aside as in 
Marco, Sarnoff, and deGrazia (2016). 
Table 1—Summary Statistics 
Outcomes Mean Median SD Sample size
Panel A. Heterogeneity in patent outcomes
Winsorized patent value from Kogan et al. (2017), $M 8.1495 2.56 16.07 356,375
Fourth-year fee payment rate 0.8708 1 0.3354 1,247,958
Eighth-year fee payment rate 0.6098 1 0.4877 697,918
Twelfth-year fee payment rate 0.2089 0 0.4065 373,207
Total patent citation within three years of grant 0.5256 0 1.461 988,585
Patent citations by same assignee within three years of grant 0.1134 0 0.7257 988,585
Patent citations by other assignees within three years of grant 0.4122 0 1.1992 988,585
Rate of patent acquisition by non-PAEs 0.1965 0 0.3974 1,270,082
Rate of patent acquisition by PAEs 0.0102 0 0.10045 1,270,082
Rate of patent litigation by non-PAEs 0.0065 0 0.0804 1,270,082
Rate of patent litigation by PAEs 0.0004 0 0.0202 1,270,082
Panel B. Changes to patent document between application and grant 
Percent change in number of words per claim 57.32 25.24 84.58 1,110,272
Percent change in number of claims −3.64 0 46.14 1,110,912
Use of Section 101—lack of utility or eligibility 0.0541 0 0.226 1,270,210
Use of Section 102(a)—prior art exists 0.0174 0 0.130 1,270,210
Use of Section 103(a)—obvious invention 0.419 0 0.493 1,270,210
Use of Section 112(b)—vague claims 0.056 0 0.231 1,270,210
Patent citations added by examiner 0.185 0 0.388 1,270,210
Panel C. Heterogeneity in examiner behavior
Number of years at the US Patent Office 6.35 7 3.19 10,018
Number of art units active in 1.80 2 0.96 10,018
Total patent applications processed 190 119 215 10,018
Patent grant rate 0.55 0.57 0.27 10,018
Use of Section 101—lack of utility or eligibility 0.09 0.02 0.14 10,018
Use of Section 102(a)—prior art exists 0.02 0.006 0.03 10,018
Use of Section 103(a)—obvious invention 0.45 0.48 0.21 10,018
Use of Section 112(b)—vague claims 0.19 0.17 0.15 10,018
Rate of patent acquisition by PAEs 0.011 0 0.032 10,018
Notes: In panels A and B, patents are the unit of observation. In panel C, patent examiners are the unit of observa-
tion. All statistics are unweighted. See Section IA for details on the sample and variable definitions. Percent change 
in number of words per claim is an average over all claims. 
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iterative process and does not simply make a  one-time  accept or reject decision. 
During this process, the examiner must substantiate her demands by referring to 
specific sections of patent law corresponding to various standards of patentabil-
ity, namely that the invention is useful and its subject matter is eligible for a pat-
ent (35 U.S.C. §101), it is novel relative to the prior art (35 U.S.C. §102(a)), it is 
 non-obvious (35 U.S.C. §103(a)), and the claims are sufficiently clear to satisfy 
the disclosure requirement (35 U.S.C. §112(b)). Panel B of Table 1 shows that on 
average  non-obviousness is used significantly more frequently than other sections.
Panel C of Table 1 presents statistics at the level of examiners. We observe 10,018 
examiners in our main analysis sample who work at the USPTO for 6.35 years 
on average. The median number of technology areas in which an examiner works 
(called “art units”) is two. The average examiner processes close to 200 patents over 
the course of our sample. The panel shows that some examiners have a much higher 
grant rate than others, or have a stronger tendency to invoke specific sections of pat-
ent law during the  back-and-forth with the applicant. We also observe large variation 
across examiners in the shares of their granted patents that are purchased by a PAE: 
the standard deviation across examiners is twice the average PAE purchase rate. 
This observed heterogeneity across examiners could merely reflect noise or the fact 
that different examiners are working on different technologies, or it could be driven 
by systematic (causal) differences in examiner behavior, which we investigate in the 
remainder of the paper.
C. Illustration of Main Findings
Some of our main results in Sections II and III can be previewed in a simple, 
graphical way. The various panels of Figure 1 document the relationship between 
patent acquisition or litigation and a simple measure of examiners’ prosecution 
behavior.
For each patent, we compute the average change in the number of words per 
claim between application and grant for all other granted patents processed by the 
same examiner, leaving out the focal patent. This  leave-one-out examiner measure 
is exogenous to the focal patent. To ensure that we compare similar examiners, we 
include art unit by patent filing year fixed effects in all specifications. To ensure that 
potential  extensive-margin selection effects are not confounding the results, we con-
trol for the ( leave-one-out) grant rate of the examiner. Conceptually, these specifi-
cations compare patent outcomes for examiners who have the same grant rate, work 
in the same art unit in the same year, but differ in the way they craft property rights, 
as measured by the change in the number of words per claim between application 
and grant.
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the probability that a patent is purchased by a 
PAE is a strongly negative function of the examiner’s propensity to ask applicants to 
add words to the patent claims (for instance to clarify them). Each dot in the binned 
scatter plot represents 5 percent of the data. The PAE purchase rate falls by about 
25 percent of the baseline rate as we move from the left to the right along the  x-axis, 
which shows very directly that the way examiners craft property rights is  first order 
for certain patent outcomes. Similarly, large effects are found for litigation by PAEs 
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and litigation by practicing firms, but not for purchases by practicing firms. The 
comparison of the various panels shows that PAEs and practicing firms respond in 
a similar way to examiners for the purpose of patent litigation (panels C and D) but 
not for patent acquisition (panels A and B).
This simple regression approach has the benefit that its robustness can imme-
diately be assessed graphically. But the choice of the variable on the  x-axis is 
arbitrary. This variable may capture only a small fraction of the relevant examiner 
behaviors, and it may be correlated with examiner traits that would suggest dif-
ferent interpretations. To address this limitation, we turn to a research design that 
can recover the full impact of examiners on patent outcomes (Section II), and we 
then correlate the  examiner-level causal estimates with a range of examiner char-
acteristics (Section III).
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Figure 1. The Effect of Examiners on Patent Acquisition and Litigation
Notes: In the various panels of this figure, the level of observation is a patent. The average change in the num-
ber of words per claim is measured at the level of an examiner, leaving out the focal patent. All specifications 
include art unit-by-year fixed effects and address potential extensive margin effects by controlling for the exam-
iner’s  leave-one-out patent grant rate (see text for details). The sample is the full patent grant sample described in 
Section IA, excluding examiners in the top 1 percent of the distribution of the total number of granted patents. The 
total number of patents granted by the examiner is used as weights in all panels. Each dot represents 5 percent of the 
data, and the OLS  best-fit lines are reported. Standard errors are clustered by examiner.
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II. Estimating Examiner Effects on Patent Outcomes
In this section, we estimate the impact of examiners on a range of patent out-
comes. We assess the validity of the identifying assumptions in our baseline design 
using additional sources of variations and alternative specifications.
A. Research Design
To estimate the extent to which patent outcomes depend on the way patent rights 
are crafted, we need variation in patent rights that is orthogonal to other determi-
nants of patent outcomes, such as technical merit. Through their  back-and-forth 
with the applicant between initial filing and grant, examiners may provide such 
variation. Conditional on patent grant, examiners affect patent rights, rather than the 
underlying idea embedded in the patent. Moreover, a growing literature suggests 
that patent applications can be treated as  quasi-randomly allocated to examiners 
working in the same art unit in the same year (Sampat and Williams 2015; Gaulé 
2015;  Farre-Mensa, Hegde, and Ljungqvist 2017).
Using  quasi-random allocation of patent applications to examiners raises three 
empirical concerns that were previewed in the introduction. First, since we are inter-
ested in recovering the full magnitude of examiner effects, conceptually we need to 
estimate fixed effects for all examiners, instead of projecting the data onto a specific 
examiner trait as in Figure 1.25 Given that we have a large number of examiners 
and work with rare outcomes, such as litigation, it is likely that we may be overfit-
ting”the fixed effects: we may misattribute some of the variation from the noise to 
causal variation across examiners. This “excess variance” problem is  well known, 
and we address it using a standard Bayesian shrinkage methodology (e.g., Kane 
and Staiger 2008; Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014a; and Chetty and Hendren 
2018). Our baseline research design focuses on addressing this issue. Second, recent 
evidence from Righi and Simcoe (2017) challenges the notion that the allocation 
of patent applications to examiners can be treated as “as good as random.” Third, 
our examiner effects could in principle be confounded by selection effects related 
to grant decisions. Using alternative sources of variation and specifications, we find 
that the second and third potential threats turn out to leave our baseline estimates 
unaffected. We, therefore, proceed by presenting our baseline design and its results, 
before turning to validation tests addressing the other potential threats.
Our baseline research design estimates examiner fixed effects on the set of 
granted patents with an empirical Bayes shrinkage correction, conditional on art 
unit by year fixed effects. The identification assumption is that the allocation of 
25 Running a specification using examiner characteristics as regressors can only recover a lower bound for the 
overall effect of examiners because the observed characteristics only capture a fraction of examiner behavior. A fixed 
effects estimator can recover the full effect, but it must be adequately adjusted to avoid excess variance due to over-
fitting of the fixed effects. In addition, the regression coefficients for the various examiner characteristics included in 
the specification should not be interpreted as causal because random assignment occurs at the level of examiners and 
the observed examiner characteristics are likely to be correlated with other, unobserved examiner characteristics. For 
instance, in contemporaneous work, Kuhn (2016) and Kuhn and Thompson (2017) create an instrumental variable 
for patent scope based on an examiner characteristic they label “scope toughness,” but this characteristic could be 
correlated with other examiner traits that may affect the patent through channels other than scope.
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( non-continuation) patents to an examiner working in the same art unit in the same 
year is as good as random, that is, it is not correlated with other determinants of 
patent outcomes. Given this assumption, we estimate examiner effects using the 
following statistical model:
(1)  Y i =  a ut (i)  +  v ij , 
  v ij =  μ j +  ϵ i , 
where  i indexes the patent,  j the examiner,  u the art unit, and  t the year;  Y i is the pat-
ent outcome of interest,  a ut(i) denotes art unit by year fixed effects,  μ j is the causal 
examiner effect of interest, and  ϵ i is an idiosyncratic  patent-level shock. Our goal is 
to recover  σ μ ≡  √ 
______
 var ( μ j ).
We estimate the standard deviation of the underlying distribution of examiner 
effects in three simple steps. We first obtain estimates of residuals  { v ˆij } for each pat-
ent by estimating art unit by year fixed effects in (1) by OLS. We then compute the 
average estimated residual per examiner in each year:
(2)  v –jt ≡  
1 _  n jt 
 ∑ 
i=1
 n jt 
  v ˆij =  μ j +  
1 _  n jt 
 ∑ 
i=1
 n jt 
  ϵ i , 
where  n jt is the number of patents processed by examiner  j in year  t . Because many 
examiners are assigned only a few patents per year (online Appendix Table D1), the 
error term cannot be expected to converge to zero for each examiner.
In a final step, we compute the covariance between an examiner’s average resid-
uals across consecutive years:
(3)  σ ˆμ =  √ 
___________
  cov ( v 
–
jt ,  v 
–
j (t+1)  ) , 
which yields a consistent and unbiased estimate of  σ μ , as can be seen immediately 
from the second equality in (2). Excess variance in the average residual is handled 
by isolating the “systematic” component of the variation in average residuals that 
persists over time. If the examiner causal effects  {  μ j } are close to zero, we may still 
observe variation in the average residuals { v –jt } across examiners in any given year 
because of idiosyncratic shocks, but there will be no covariance between examiners’ 
average residuals across years because the idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated. 
We call  σ μ the “signal” standard deviation of examiner effects to contrast it with the 
“raw” standard deviation of residuals, which is contaminated by noise. The covari-
ance calculation in (3) uses the counts of patents granted by each examiner  { n jt } as 
weights to increase precision.
The signal standard deviation is our primary focus because it is informative about 
the overall variation from examiners, but we also compute individual estimates of 
causal effects for each examiner. We compute an average of the residuals  v ˆij over all 
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years for each examiner, which we denote  v –j .
26 We then construct the empirical Bayes 
posterior estimate of each examiner effect by multiplying  v –j by a shrinkage factor:
(4)  μ ˆ j =  
 σ ˆ μ 
2
 _______ 
var ( v j 
–
) 
⋅  v –j . 
The shrinkage factor is the ratio of signal variance to total variance.27 We validate 
this research design by documenting in Section IIC that this approach yields unbi-
ased estimates of examiner effects in  out-of-sample tests, while ignoring excess 
variance delivers misleading results.
B. Baseline Estimates of Examiner Effects
Table 2 reports the estimates of examiner causal effects for a range of patent out-
comes. We find substantial examiner effects for private value and outcomes related 
to patent litigation.
Private value is strongly affected by examiner effects. The first row of Table 2 
shows that the signal standard deviation of examiner effects corresponds to a $3.32 
26 To increase precision,  v –j is computed using weights that make  v 
–
j a minimum variance unbiased estimate of  μ j 
for each examiner. This step requires estimating the variances of other shocks in the statistical model. Specifically, 
we allow for an  examiner-by-year shock  θ jt and compute  σ ˆϵ 
2 = var( v ij −  v 
–
jt ) and  σ ˆ θ 
2 = var( v ij ) −  σ ˆμ 
2 −  σ ˆ ϵ 
2 . We 
obtain  v –j =  ∑ t 
 
  w jt  v 
–
jt , with  w jt =  h jt / ∑  
  h jt and  h jt = 1/( σ ˆ θ 
2 + ( σ ˆ ϵ 
2 / n jt )) . See online Appendix A for a complete 
discussion.
27 Online Appendix A discusses the computation of  var( v j 
– ) . Because of the precision weights in  v –j , the shrinkage 
factor is lower for examiners for which more patents are observed. The estimated examiner effects {  μ ˆ j } have an 
empirical Bayes interpretation as the Bayesian posterior estimates of the examiner effects, starting from a normal 
prior distribution centered around zero with signal variance  σ μ . There is also a frequentist interpretation: the shrink-
age factor is the OLS coefficient in a hypothetical regression of the true (unobserved)  μ j on the (observed)  v 
–
j .
Table 2—Signal Standard Deviations of Examiner Causal Effects on Patent Outcomes
Signal SD Shrunk effect 
SD, percent 
of average
Sample size, 
patents/examinersPercent of average Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Patent value from Kogan et al. (2017), $M 40.80 (38.94–41.95) 3.32 29.48 356,375/7,937
Fourth-year fee payment rate 3.76 (3.64–3.91) 0.0328 2.18 1,247,958/9,543
Eighth-year fee payment rate 10.79 (10.40–10.82) 0.0658 6.32 697,918/8,580
Twelfth-year fee payment rate 22.62 (21.44–23.37) 0.0472 11.50 373,207/8,289
log total patent citation 23.79 (23.27–24.15) 0.0610 14.04 988,585/8,620
log patent citations by same assignee 46.06 (43.62–48.63) 0.0278 25.65 988,585/8,620
log patent citations by other assignees 24.47 (23.88–24.80) 0.0512 14.10 988,585/8,620
Rate of patent acquisition by non-PAEs 14.61 (13.60–15.41) 0.0287 7.66 1,270,082/9,564
Rate of patent acquisition by PAEs 62.96 (52.95–70.93) 0.0064 31.11 1,270,082/9,564
Rate of patent litigation by non-PAEs 64.25 (52.79–72.73) 0.0042 27.43 1,270,082/9,564
Rate of patent litigation by PAEs 46.04 (0–147.76) 0.0002 4.84 1,270,082/9,564
Notes: This table reports the signal standard deviations of examiner effects as a percentage of the mean (column 1) 
and in level (column 2), as well as the standard deviations of shrunk examiner effects (column 3). The Bayesian 
shrinkage methodology used to obtain these estimates is presented in Section IIA. In column 2, 95 percent con-
fidence intervals are obtained by bootstrapping. The log patent citation variables refer to the log of one plus the 
number of citations within three years of grant. The patent value variable is right winsorized at the ninety-ninth per-
centile. See Section IA for details on the sample and variable definitions. 
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million change in patent value, using the estimates from Kogan et al. (2017). In per-
centage terms, one signal standard deviation in examiner effects explains 40.8 per-
cent of the average patent value for  publicly traded firms. The process of creation 
of patent rights therefore has a  first-order impact on a patent’s private value to its 
assigned firm. We confirm this result in rows two to four of the table by considering 
other proxies. The rates of payment of patent maintenance fees at the various hori-
zons are all responsive to examiner effects. Consistent with the notion that fee pay-
ments can only give a lower bound on private valuations, especially in earlier years 
when the fees are smaller, the examiner effects are smaller than with the Kogan et al. 
(2017) estimates; the signal standard deviations are under 10 percent of the average 
payment rate.
Citations also respond to examiner effects. Considering in turn the signal standard 
deviations for total patent citations, self-citations, and citations by other assignees, 
we consistently find significant effects. The impact is strongest for  self-citations, 
with a signal standard deviation of 46.06 percent, while the signal standard devia-
tion for citations by other assignees is only 24.47 percent. This finding points to the 
role of cumulative innovation by the assignee.28
We find particularly strong examiner effects for litigation and PAEs’ activities. 
The signal standard deviation of examiner effects accounts for over 60 percent of the 
baseline rate of patent purchases by PAEs. In contrast, the impact of examiners on 
the probability that a patent is sold to a practicing firm is much smaller: the signal 
standard deviation is 14.6 percent of the baseline rate. The impact of examiners on 
the probability that a patent is litigated is very large: the signal standard deviation 
is about 65 percent of the baseline rate. Considering the raw standard deviation of 
examiner effects would be very misleading: for rare outcomes like patent litigation 
or PAE purchase, the raw standard deviation is implausibly high, over four times 
larger than the signal standard deviation (online Appendix Table D2).
We use a bootstrapping procedure for inference. We  redraw samples from the 
 application-level dataset with replacement and repeat the estimation of the signal 
standard deviations.29 The 95 percent confidence intervals are reported in column 1 
of Table 2 . The signal standard deviations are all precisely estimated, except for one 
extremely rare outcome, patent litigation by PAEs.
The standard deviation of shrunk examiner effects obtained from equation (4) is 
also substantial. Column 3 of Table 2 reports these results. For instance, the standard 
deviation of shrunk examiner effects accounts for 29.48 percent of the average pat-
ent value from Kogan et al. (2017), 31.11 percent of the baseline rate of PAE patent 
purchases, and 27.43 percent of the average rate of patent litigation.
The large signal standard deviations indicate that examiners play an important 
role in determining patent outcomes.30 Consequently, policies affecting examiners 
28 Although this finding may also reflect strategic self-citations, the literature on strategic self-citations has 
emphasized the importance of strategic continuation filings, while we focus on  non-continuation patents.
29 We also bootstrapped by  re-sampling within examiner or within examiner by filing year and obtained similar 
results (not reported).
30 We also find sizable examiner effects on the “disruptiveness” statistics developed by Funk and  Owen-Smith 
(2016), which are based on citation patterns. The signal standard deviation estimate for their baseline index (denoted 
“ C D t ”) is 0.0286, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 0.0272–0.0298. The underlying standard deviation 
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have the potential to greatly affect the US innovation system, for instance regarding 
litigation rates or the activities of PAEs. The large standard deviations of shrunk 
examiner effects indicate that, based on historical data, one can identify examiners 
who have a particularly large impact on specific outcomes.31 Our analysis so far 
is silent on the characteristics of these examiners, which we turn to in Section III. 
Before doing so, we establish the validity of our identification assumptions with a 
series of tests and robustness checks.
C. Validation of Baseline Design: 
Addressing  Nonrandom Assignment and Selection
In this subsection, we use alternative research designs and specifications to inves-
tigate potential limitations of the baseline research design.
Alternative Source of Variation #1: Allocation of Applications to Examiners 
Using the Last Digit of the Application’s Serial Number.—A potential concern with 
our baseline research design is that there is specialization even across examiners 
working in the same art unit at the same time (Righi and Simcoe 2017). If special-
ization patterns are correlated with other factors that affect patent outcomes, then the 
examiner effects documented in Table 2 may reflect omitted variable bias.
To address this potential concern, we identify art units where application assign-
ment to examiners is determined by the last digit of the serial number of the patent 
application. The last digit of an application’s serial number, ranging from 0 to 9, is 
determined by the order of submission of applications and is therefore orthogonal 
to potential confounding variables such as technical factors.32 Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some art units assign applications to examiners based on the last digit 
of the serial number (Lemley and Sampat 2012). To determine which art units do 
so at different points in time, we compute an index of “concentration” of last digits 
across examiners working in the same art unit in the same year. If some examiners 
systematically get specific last digits, we will find a high degree of concentration. We 
use the concentration index initially developed by Mori, Nishikimi, and Smith (2005) 
to study industry agglomeration, which was recently applied by Righi and Simcoe 
(2017) to the context of patents to study examiner specialization.33 Applied to our 
purposes, the test delivers an  χ 2 -statistic asking whether applications’ last digits are 
less dispersed across examiners than one would expect if last digits were not used for 
of the  C D t measure is 0.184. This finding indicates that examiners have an effect on the patterns of citations, in 
addition to the overall count.
31 We found that examiner effects do not tend to “average out” across outcomes; for instance, there is a large 
share of examiners who produce patents with systematically lower value, fewer citations, and higher probabilities 
of litigation or of PAE purchase (not reported).
32 When a patent application is filed, the Office of Patent Application Processing assigns it a serial number. The 
first part of the serial number indicates the technology category, while the last digits reflect the order of arrival of 
applications.
33 Righi and Simcoe (2017) uses this test to document specialization of examiners in the same art unit and year, 
specifically testing for failure of random assignment with respect to technological features of the patent. We use the 
same test but for the opposite purpose: we use the test to identify art units that allocate applications based on their 
last digits, which implies  quasi-random allocation with respect to technological features of the patent.
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application assignment.34 We carry out the test in each year and each art unit and find 
that there is a large number of art units with a  p-value below 1 percent, indicating that 
these art units use applications’ last digits to assign patents.35 Online Appendix and 
Appendix Figure D1 present the methodology and results in more detail.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the signal standard deviations estimated for art units 
that allocate patents using last digits are quantitatively similar to those from the base-
line design. Column 1 shows the signal standard deviations for various outcomes in 
the  subsample of art units with a  p-value below 0.01 in the  χ 2 -test. Moreover, column 
2 repeats the estimation of the signal standard deviation in the subsample of art units 
belonging to information technologies.36 The results are similar in this subsample as 
well, which is comforting because Righi and Simcoe (2017) reports that they find no 
evidence of examiner specialization in information technologies.37
Alternative Source of Variation #2: A Busyness Instrument.—A limitation of 
using art units that allocate applications using last digits is that these art units 
account for only about a third of all art units. There is anecdotal evidence that some 
art units allocate applications to examiners based on the timing of arrival of appli-
cations (Lemley and Sampat (2012)). When a new application arrives at the patent 
office, an examiner who recently finished processing another application may be 
particularly likely to be assigned the new application, because they happen to have 
more time on their hands.
To proxy for how busy an examiner is when a given new application arrives, we 
measure the number of cases closed by the examiner in the two preceding weeks. 
For each incoming application, we compute assignment probabilities across all 
examiners working in the relevant art unit and time period based on the number of 
cases closed in the previous two weeks, art unit by year fixed effects, and examiner 
fixed effects. Within an art unit and year, assignment probabilities vary only because 
of changes in (relative) busyness across examiners. We estimate  assignment prob-
abilities using a simple linear probability model, presented in online Appendix A.
Using the estimated assignment probabilities across examiners, we instrument 
for the characteristics of the examiner who actually processed the application. For 
instance, if an application arrives in the art unit at a time when only “lenient” patent 
examiners (who tend to ask the applicant to make only a few changes to the patent) 
happen to be free, then the application should be more likely to receive a more 
34 Formally, we are testing the null that applications’ assignments are independent of their last digit; this test 
can be viewed as a multivariate generalization of a  t-statistic comparing observed frequencies to the distribution 
under random assignment. For details, see online Appendix A as well as Mori, Nishikimi, and Smith (2005) and 
Righi and Simcoe (2017).
35 The analysis is conducted separately for each art  unit-year. The total number of art  unit-years is 7,695, out of 
which 1,456 have  p-values below 0.01, 1,612 below 0.05, and 1,750 below 0.10. The number of art units is 710, out 
of which 249 have at least one year with  p-values below 0.01, 286 below 0.05, and 329 below 0.10.
36 This subsample includes the following technology centers: computer architecture and software (21); com-
puter networks, multiplex, cable and cryptography/security (24); communications (26); and business method art 
units (3620s, 3680s, 3690s). We exclude technology center 2800 (semiconductors), which Righi and Simcoe (2017) 
identifies as having significant examiner specialization.
37 The signal standard deviation for patent value from Kogan et al. (2017) is smaller in the IT subsample (3) 
than in the full sample (Table 2). But this is due to heterogeneity in the signal standard deviation of examiner effects 
across technology categories rather than to endogeneity concerns; online Appendix Table D3 reports smaller signal 
standard deviations for patent value in  IT-related technology categories.
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lenient treatment. Using this source of variation, we can document the relationship 
between any given examiner characteristic and any patent outcomes. Specifically, 
we can use the estimated assignment probabilities to compute the expected exam-
iner characteristic, which we can relate to the actual characteristic of the examiner 
who handled the application (the “first stage”) and to any patent outcome of interest 
(the “reduced form”).
Figure 2 presents the results of the busyness approach. The panels are based on 
the following specifications:
(5)  E j (i)  =  β 1 (  ∑ j∈ut (i)  
 
  p ij  E j ) +  a ut (i)  +  ν i , 
(6)  Y i =  β 2 (  ∑ j∈ut (i)  
 
  p ij  E j ) +  a ut (i)  +  κ i , 
Table 3—Validation of Baseline Estimates of Examiner Effects
Signal SD, percent of average
(1) (2)
Panel A. Accounting for violations of random assignment
Patent value from Kogan et al. (2017) 44.32 15.89
log total patent citation 21.10 22.78
Rate of patent acquisition by non-PAEs 15.38 10.01
Rate of patent acquisition by PAEs 40.01 41.25
Rate of patent litigation by non-PAEs 55.65 64.36
Sample Art units allocating 
patents by last digits 
according to  χ 2 -test
Art units in 
information 
technology
Number of art units 249 254
Signal SD, percent of average
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B. Accounting for extensive margin selection effects
Patent value from Kogan et al. (2017) 40.46 41.48 40.28
log total patent citation 18.66 22.17 22.00
Rate of patent acquisition by non-PAEs 14.31 17.03 16.90
Rate of patent acquisition by PAEs 62.64 76.20 76.77
Rate of patent litigation by non-PAEs 63.06 89.93 89.88
Controls Examiner grant rate Examiner 
grant rate and 
application 
characteristics
Examiner grant 
rate, application 
 characteristics, and 
their interactions
SD of shrunk examiner effects, percent of average
Panel C. Accounting for excess variance with empirical Bayes beta-binomial count model
Rate of patent acquisition by PAEs 46.72
Rate of patent acquisition by non-PAEs 7.99
Rate of patent litigation by non-PAEs 48.95
Notes: Panel A reports the signal standard deviations of several examiner effects using the Bayesian shrinkage meth-
odology in two subsamples in which there is no examiner specialization within art unit. Panel B repeats the calcula-
tion of the signal standard deviations of examiner effects in the same sample as Table 2, but adding controls to address 
potential selection effects. Panel C reports the standard deviation of average shrunk examiner effects using the empir-
ical Bayes beta-binomial count model. See Section IIC for a description of the methodologies underlying each panel. 
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where  i indexes the patent,  j the examiner,  u the art unit, and  t time;  p ij denotes 
the  application-specific examiner assignment probability;  E j denotes the examiner 
characteristic, measured using a  leave-one-out procedure that does not use infor-
mation on patent  i ;  E j (i)  is the ( leave-one-out) characteristic of the examiner who 
actually processed application  i ; and  Y i is the patent outcome of interest. Figure 2 
estimates these specifications, considering the ( leave-one-out) change in the num-
ber of words per claim as the examiner characteristic and the (actual) purchase by 
a PAE as the outcome of interest. This choice of variables allows for a compari-
son with Figure 1, which did not use the busyness instrument and was using raw 
variation in the examiner’s propensity to change the number of words per claim 
between application and grant.
Panel A of Figure 2 reports the relationship between the actual and expected 
examiner characteristics, as in (5). The slope is strong and positive, and the binned 
scatterplot is close to linear, indicating that the busyness instrument has power. 
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the relationship between PAE purchase and the expected 
examiner propensity to increase the number of words per claims; there is a strong 
downward relationship. These patterns are similar to Figure 1, which used the raw 
variation in examiner characteristic instead of the busyness instrument. These results 
provide additional evidence that departures from random assignment of examiners 
to applications do not bias our estimates.
Accounting for Potential Selection Effects on the Extensive Margin.—Another 
potential concern with our baseline research design is that our estimates may be con-
founded by selection effects stemming from the decision to grant a patent. Examiners 
differ in their grant rates, therefore it could be the case that patent outcomes vary 
across examiners because of underlying differences across examiners’ pools of 
granted patents, independent of the crafting of patent rights. For instance, examiners 
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Figure 2. A Busyness Instrument for the Effect of Examiners on Patent Acquisition by PAEs
Notes: Panel A shows the relationship between the busyness instrument (described in the main text) for an exam-
iner’s propensity to change the number of words per claim during application and grant and the propensity of the 
examiner whom the application was actually assigned to. Panel B depicts the relationship between the busyness 
instrument and the purchase rate by PAEs. On both panels, each dot represents 5 percent of the data, and OLS 
 best-fit lines are reported.
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with a low grant rate might only grant patents of high technical merit. To investigate 
this possibility, we introduce controls for the examiner’s  leave-one-out grant rate in 
equation (1) and then repeat the estimation of the signal standard deviation using 
equation (3). With this specification, we are now estimating the amount of system-
atic variation in patent outcomes across examiners who work in the same art unit, in 
the same year, and have the same grant rate.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results and shows that our baseline estimates remain 
virtually unaffected. Column 1 controls for the grant rate in (3).38 The estimated 
signal standard deviations are very similar to our baseline estimates from Table 2. 
In principle, it may be possible for extensive margin effects to operate even across 
examiners with the same grant rate. For instance, an examiner may systematically 
grant patents with underlying technological characteristics that appeal to PAEs, 
while another examiner (with a similar overall grant rate) may tend to systemati-
cally reject those patents and grant others. To assess how strong this effect might be 
empirically, Column 2 introduces controls for a host of initial characteristics of the 
patent application, namely the application’s initial number of independent claims 
and number of words per claim; the assignee’s number of applications, grants, and 
citations prior to the filing date; and the first inventor’s number of applications, 
grants, and citations prior to the filing date. The estimates of signal standard devia-
tions are not sensitive to these controls, indicating that extensive margin effects are 
unlikely to bias our estimates in any meaningful way. Column 3 reports the results 
with a more demanding specification for the controls, adding interaction terms 
between the examiner’s grant rate and each of the eight initial application charac-
teristics introduced in column 2. The estimated signal standard deviations remain 
virtually unchanged.39
Accurately Accounting for Excess Variance.—The preceding discussion indicates 
that our results are robust to failures of random assignment and extensive margin 
selection effects. A remaining potential concern is that the empirical Bayes shrink-
age correction used in our baseline research design may fail to account for noise 
perfectly. To address this point, we first discuss some plausible limitations of our 
baseline design, in particular for rare binary outcomes such as litigation; we then 
present an alternative approach that addresses these limitations and produces similar 
38 To flexibly control for the grant rate, we introduce a quartic polynomial in the grant rate. The results are sim-
ilar when controlling linearly for the grant rate or introducing  higher order polynomials (not reported).
39 In principle, our results could be biased by some unobserved ( predetermined) characteristics of granted pat-
ents that vary systematically across examiners. However, it is reassuring that controlling for the examiner’s grant 
rate as well as observable determinants of patent quality leaves our estimated signal standard deviation almost 
unchanged. Oster (2017) shows formally how selection on observables may be informative about selection on 
unobservables. Oster’s (2017) approach can be applied informally to our setting by making a simple assumption: 
assume that the signal standard deviation of examiners’ “selection effects” (i.e., the amount of  cross-examiner 
variation in the technical merit of granted patents) is larger across examiners with different grant rates than across 
examiners with the same grant rate. Under this assumption, our specifications controlling for examiners’ average 
grant rates can bound overall selection bias. Namely, if controlling for examiners’ grant rates reduces the signal 
standard deviation by  X percentage points (relative to the baseline specification), then the assumption implies that 
unobserved selection effects across examiners with the same grant rates can reduce the signal standard deviation by 
at most another  X percentage points, that is, the total bias must be under  2 × X percentage points. In fact, we found 
that controlling for examiners’ grant rates leaves the results almost unaffected, that is,  X is small, which suggests 
that overall selection effects are small. 
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results. Finally, we use  out-of-sample tests to directly show that our baseline design 
accurately accounts for excess variance.
Our baseline research design yields very large signal standard deviation esti-
mates for rare binary outcomes, such as litigation or purchase by a PAE, but the 
Bayesian shrinkage correction may not be appropriate in such cases. Indeed, for 
binary outcomes, our statistical model in equation (1) may be misspecified as it does 
not impose the constraint that the predicted value should lie between zero and one. 
Given that rare binary outcomes have a particularly high estimated signal standard 
deviation in Table 2, it appears important to assess whether these results are sensi-
tive to a change in the underlying statistical model.
We repeat the analysis using an empirical Bayes  beta-binomial count model, 
a common statistical model that can fit count data in a flexible way (Ellison 
and Swanson (2010)). To see how this framework operates, consider the example of 
patent purchases by PAEs. For each examiner  j , we observe data of the form  ( n j ,  r j ) , 
where  n j is the examiner’s total number of granted patents and  r j is the number of 
patents granted by the examiner that were purchased by PAEs. We assume that the 
probability  p of granting a patent purchased by a PAE follows a beta distribution 
across examiners working in the same art unit in the same year:  p ∼ Beta(α, β ) . 
Given that we are examining the count of PAE purchases across examiners, the like-
lihood function for the data is a binomial distribution. Using the fact that the beta 
distribution is the conjugate prior of the binomial distribution, we show in online 
Appendix A that the integrated likelihood is
  L ( r j | n j , α, β) =  (  
 n j 
  r j )  
Γ (α + β) 
 _
Γ (α) Γ (β) 
   
Γ ( r j + α) Γ ( n j −  r j + β) 
  ___________________ 
Γ ( n j + α + β) 
 , 
which we estimate via maximum likelihood in each art unit by year. Having recov-
ered estimates of the hyper-parameters,  α ˆ and  β ˆ , we compute the posterior mean for 
each examiner:40
(7)  μ ˆ j 
BetaBinomial =  
 α ˆ +  r j 
 _ 
 α ˆ +  β ˆ +  n j 
. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports the standard deviation of the estimates; we continue to 
find large examiner effects. This finding indicates that our large estimates for the 
impact of examiner on patent litigation and purchase by PAEs is not an artifact of 
the statistical model used in our baseline design.
To conclude this section, we conduct  out-of-sample tests of the examiner effects 
estimated in our baseline research design to check that we have recovered estimates 
of the correct magnitude. After splitting the main analysis sample into two 50 per-
cent samples at random, we compute in each subsample the raw examiner effects 
using equation (2) and the shrunk examiner effects using equation (4). To test pre-
dictive accuracy, we regress the raw examiner effect from the first subsample on 
40 Intuitively, this procedure shrinks an examiner’s PAE share toward the mean PAE share in the art unit. The 
amount of shrinkage is larger for examiners who have granted fewer patents.
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the shrunk examiner effects from the second subsample.41 We also regress the raw 
examiner effect from the first subsample on the raw examiner effect from the sec-
ond subsample to assess whether a standard regression approach would suffer from 
excess variance. We do so in the full sample but also in a reduced sample of exam-
iners who granted more than 50 patents, as measurement error may no longer be a 
problem if sufficiently many patents are observed per examiner.
Figure 3 reports the results and shows that the empirical Bayes shrinkage 
approach yields unbiased estimates of examiner effects, in contrast with standard 
regression analysis. A regression coefficient of one indicates unbiased prediction, 
while a coefficient below one indicates attenuation bias and implies that the esti-
mates suffer from excess variance due to noise. Figure 3 shows that our baseline 
design delivers unbiased estimates of examiner effects even for rare outcomes such 
as patent purchase by PAEs or patent litigation. The point estimates are very close to 
one and precisely estimated. In contrast, the specifications without shrinkage always 
deliver a coefficient well below one, indicating that the raw variation in examiner 
effects contains a lot of noise. This problem is less acute for outcomes that are more 
common, such as the patent value measure of Kogan et al. (2017) (with a regression 
coefficient close to 0.5 full sample), than for rare outcomes like patent litigation 
41 We regress raw effects on shrunk effects because the shrinkage factor in the shrunk effects addresses measure-
ment error, which poses an issue for the independent variable but not the dependent variable.
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Figure 3. Out-of-Sample Tests of Baseline Estimates of Examiner Effects
Notes: This figure reports the OLS coefficients in  examiner-level  out-of-sample regressions. After splitting the 
main analysis sample into two halves at random, we compute the raw and shrunk examiner effects on each half fol-
lowing the methodology described in Section IIC. To test predictive accuracy, we regress the raw examiner effect 
from the first half on examiner effects estimated in the second half, using, in turn, as regressors the shrunk exam-
iner effects (shrinkage), the raw examiner effects (no shrinkage, all examiners), and the raw examiner effects for 
the subset of examiners who have granted more than 50 patents (no shrinkage, examiners with >50 patents only). 
A regression coefficient of one indicates unbiased prediction. The  heteroskedasticity-robust 95 percent confidence 
interval is reported.
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(with a regression coefficient close to 0.1 in the full sample). Restricting the analysis 
to examiners who handle a lot of patents does not solve the problem, which offers 
another vindication of our baseline research design.
D. Robustness Checks
Table 4 shows the robustness of the signal standard deviations when using alter-
native samples and specifications. The first row repeats the analysis including con-
tinuation applications; the second row includes all granted patents from 1976 to 
2015; the third row controls for the length of time between filing and grant to assess 
whether the results may be driven by delays rather than by the way patent rights are 
crafted; the fourth row includes fixed effects for examiner experience as in Frakes 
and Wasserman (2017).42 The results are very similar across samples and specifica-
tions. Finally, the online Appendix shows that the signal standard deviations are of 
comparable magnitudes across technology categories (online Appendix Table D3) 
and reports the distributions of the shrunk examiner effects (online Appendix 
Figure D3).
III. Implications for Patent Assertion Entities
Our analysis so far has established that examiner effects are an important driver 
of a wide range of patent outcomes, in particular those related to PAEs and litiga-
tion. In this section, motivated by the large sensitivity of PAEs to examiner effects, 
we investigate the features of examiner behavior that drive PAEs’ responses. We 
find that “lenient” examiners, who issue patents with higher litigation and invalidity 
42 An alternative to the inclusion of examiner experience fixed effects in our baseline specification is to look 
for discontinuities in patent outcomes around examiners’ promotions; we find no discontinuity (online Appendix 
Figure D2), which confirms that examiner experience effects play a  second-order role compared with the examiner 
fixed effects we focus on.
Table 4—Robustness Checks on Examiner Causal Effects on Patent Outcomes
Signal SD, percent of average
Patent value 
from Kogan 
et al. (2017)
log total 
patent 
citations
Purchase by 
practicing 
firm
Purchase 
by PAE
Litigation by 
practicing 
firm
(A) Including continuations 41.8 24.9 16.8 78.9 90.7
(B) Granted patent from 1976 to 2015 36.7 22.4 15.8 72.3 62.6
(C) Including review time controls 40.8 23.2 14.6 62.9 64.3
(D) Including examiner career controls 41.5 24.6 13.5 55.8 55.4
Notes: Row (A) adds continuation applications that were filed and granted between 2001 and 2012 to our baseline 
analysis sample that covers the same period. Row (B) uses the sample of all non-continuation granted patents from 
1976 to 2015. Row (C) controls for “time under review” in equation (1) with a quadratic polynomial in the num-
ber of years between filing and grant. Row (D) controls for examiner career effects in equation (1) with experience 
fixed effects, as defined in Frakes and Wasserman (2017) (namely, the examiner’s general schedule (GS) level by 
bins corresponding to 0–1, 2–3, 4–5, 6–7, 8+ years experience at that level). All reported values are normalized by 
the average in the relevant sample.
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risks, produce a much higher share of patents purchased and asserted by PAEs. We 
discuss how this evidence helps discipline theories of PAE behavior.
A. Research Design
There are two standard views of the role played by PAEs in the patent mar-
ket. According to the first view, PAEs could be useful intermediaries who address 
standard frictions in the patent market by lowering transaction costs and solv-
ing liquidity problems (Hagiu and Yoffie 2013; Abrams et al. 2019; Lu 2012; 
Galetovic, Haber, and Levine 2015). The second view suggests that PAEs do not 
help address any particular friction but, rather, exploit limitations of the legal sys-
tem by asserting patents of questionable validity in the hope that targeted firms 
will pay them settlement fees instead of risking a costly and uncertain trial (Miller 
2013; Council of Economic Advisers 2013; Cohen, Gurun, and Kominers 2016; 
Federal Trade Commission 2016).
We investigate the extent to which the two standard views can account for the 
(quantitatively large) patterns related to examiners in the data. Examiners have a 
large impact on PAEs: a one standard deviation change in examiner effects shifts the 
probability of patent acquisition by a PAE by over 60 percent of the baseline rate 
(Table 2). This fact may not be incompatible with the two standard views of PAE 
behavior. For instance, the process of creation of patent rights may create frictions 
affecting both PAEs and practicing firms (in line with the first view) or may lead 
to the issuance of questionable patents that only PAEs are willing to purchase and 
exploit via frivolous litigation (in line with the second view).
We examine this question using detailed data on the prosecution behaviors 
of examiners, drawing a contrast between the responses of PAEs and practicing 
firms. We start by characterizing the prosecution behaviors that are predictive of 
future purchase or litigation by a PAE or practicing firms (Section IIIB); we then 
investigate whether these prosecution behaviors are predictive of patent invalidity 
(Section IIIC). Specifically, we run regressions of the following form:
(8)  Y i = β E j (i)  +  a ut (i)  +  ϵ i , 
where  i indexes the patent,  j the examiner, and  ut the art  unit by year;  Y i is the pat-
ent outcome of interest; and  E j(i) is a (vector of ) examiner behavior(s), estimated 
using a  leave-one-out procedure that does not use information on patent  i . We scale 
the examiner behavior measures  E j(i) by their signal standard deviations, which are 
estimated using (3). This standardization gives us the proper scaling to compare the 
quantitative importance of various examiner traits.43
We rely on a variety of proxies reflecting different aspects of examiner behavior 
to isolate robust correlations with the potential to inform theories of PAE behav-
ior. The estimates from specification (8) cannot be interpreted as causal because 
 quasi-random assignment occurs at the level of examiners working in the same art 
43 Specification (8) is analogous to the regression underlying Figure 1, except that we now use properly scaled 
regressors.
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unit at the same time, and not at the level of examiners’ traits. Given that  quasi-random 
assignment is at the level of examiners, the only causal effect that can be recovered 
is the effect of the examiner “as a whole” on patent outcomes (as in Section II).44 
In contrast, the relationships between specific examiner traits and patent outcomes 
may be biased by potential omitted variables (i.e., other traits of the examiner that 
are unobserved). To address this limitation, we use several proxies to control for 
various aspects of examiner behavior, and we focus on establishing correlations that 
(i) are quantitatively large and robust to the inclusion of additional controls and (ii) 
can be interpreted as reflecting a more general trait of the examiner, such as the pro-
pensity to let the applicant keep the text of the claims relatively unchanged between 
application and grant (“leniency”).
B. PAEs and Examiner Behavior
In this subsection, we document which examiner traits correlate with patent 
acquisition or litigation by PAEs and practicing entities. We use specification (8) 
and consider seven measures that capture different aspects of examiner behavior.
We use three general proxies for the degree of “leniency” of the examiner. By 
examiner leniency, we refer to the extent to which the examiner makes demands 
on the applicant during prosecution. First, the percentage change in the number of 
words per claim (averaged across claims) indicates the extent to which the examiner 
asks the applicant to refine the claims. Second, the percentage change in the number 
of claims reflects the extent to which the examiner affects the overall structure and 
scope of the patent document. Third, the examiner’s grant rate is another natural 
proxy for leniency: examiners who are more demanding on applicants generally 
have lower grant rates.
To characterize in greater detail the examiner behaviors that drive PAEs’ activi-
ties, we measure examiners’ propensities to cite specific sections of patent law when 
asking the applicant to revise the patent. As mentioned previously, the examiner must 
substantiate any demand by referring to specific sections of patent law corresponding 
to various standards of patentability. An examiner who is less lenient should refer 
more often to any of the sections compared with other examiners working in the same 
art unit at the same time. The relative frequency of usage of the various sections may 
differ across examiners depending on their examination styles. Examiners who place 
more emphasis on the invention being useful and eligible for a patent should use 
 Section 101 more often; those who particularly care about prior inventions should 
refer to Section 102 frequently; Section 103 should be invoked more often by exam-
iners who are particularly sensitive to the requirement that the invention should be 
 non-obvious to someone who knows the field; and Section 112(b) should be used by 
examiners who focus on the requirement of claim clarity.45
44 One would need a  quasi-experiment that directly affects specific behaviors (e.g., a training program) in order 
to recover more granular causal impacts.
45 Although all examiners are supposed to apply the same standards for patent grant, which are determined 
by patent law, we find large causal variation across examiners in terms of their propensity to refer to the various 
sections (online Appendix Table D4).
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Table 5 presents the results with patent acquisition as the outcome.46 In both pan-
els, the first seven columns run univariate regressions, while columns 8 and 9  consider 
multivariate regressions. Panel A shows that all proxies of examiner leniency deliver 
a similar message: more lenient examiners grant substantially more patents that are 
eventually purchased by PAEs. The regression coefficients are standardized by the 
signal standard deviations of the regressors and expressed as a percentage of the out-
come. Column 1 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the distribution of 
46 The sample is restricted to art units that are part of information technologies since PAEs are primarily active 
in these art units (online Appendix Table D5). All results reported in this section are similar in the full sample 
(online Appendix Tables D6, D7, and D8) and in the subsample of art  unit-years within IT that use  digit-based, 
 quasi-random assignment (online Appendix Tables D9 and D10).
Table 5—Patent Acquisition and Examiner Behavior
Patent purchase by PAE
Leave-one-out examiner effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Patent acquisition by PAEs
% change in number of words −0.139 −0.115
 per claim from app to grant (0.030) (0.0490)
% change in number of claims 0.073 0.0519
 from app to grant (0.034) (0.0345)
Grant rate 0.114 −0.0298
(0.028) (0.0637)
Use of Section 101 −0.061 −0.0468 −0.0225
 Ineligible, lack utility (0.036) (0.035) (0.0366)
Use of Section 102(a) 0.007 0.0171 0.00835
 Prior art exists (0.021) (0.021) (0.0216)
Use of Section 103(a) −0.0602 −0.050 −0.0223
 Obvious invention (0.024) (0.026) (0.0285)
Use of Section 112(b) −0.037 −0.004 −0.00392
 Vague claims (0.027) (0.026) (0.0291)
Fixed effects Year by art unit
Observations 274,464 274,537 311,615 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 274,464
Patent purchase by practicing firm
Leave-one-out examiner effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B. Patent acquisition by practicing firms
% change in number of words 0.0071 0.0349
 per claim from app to grant (0.0081) (0.011)
% change in number of claims −0.0003 −0.0001
 from app to grant (0.006) (0.006)
Grant rate 0.022 0.062
(0.0082) (0.012)
Use of Section 101 0.0147 0.0154 0.0174
 Ineligible, lack utility (0.0065) (0.00711) (0.0073)
Use of Section 102(a) −0.0037 −0.00498 −0.007
 Prior art exists (0.005) (0.00556) (0.006)
Use of Section 103(a) 0.0065 0.00539 0.007
 Obvious invention (0.005) (0.00633) (0.006)
Use of Section 112(b) 0.002 −0.00419 0.003
 Vague claims (0.005) (0.00619) (0.006)
Fixed effects Year by art unit
Observations 274,464 274,537 311,615 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 274,464
Notes: The sample is restricted to IT patents. Regressors are standardized by their standard deviations, and coeffi-
cients are expressed as a fraction of the mean of the outcome. Standard errors are clustered by examiners.
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examiner effects for the change in number of words per claim implies a 13.9 percent 
decrease in the probability of purchase by a PAE. This fraction is relatively large, 
given that a one standard deviation change in the overall examiner effect accounts 
for about 60 percent of the baseline rate (Table 2). Columns 2 and 3 show that the 
effect goes in the same direction, with a similar magnitude, for the other broad prox-
ies for examiner leniency: a one standard deviation increase in the change in number 
of claims implies a 7.3 percent increase in the probability of PAE purchase;47 the 
corresponding number for grant rates is 11.4 percent. Columns 4 to 7 show that 
the same finding holds when considering the use of various sections of patent law: 
examiners who use sections more often tend to have a lower rate of purchase by 
PAEs (although some specifications are noisy). Column 8 presents the results of 
a specification that simultaneously includes all types of references to patent law. 
In this specification, the section relating to the obviousness of the invention is the 
most important. Finally, specification (9) includes all regressors simultaneously. 
The results become more noisy because of collinearity, but the coefficient on the 
change in the number of words per claim remains large, significant, and similar in 
magnitude to the univariate regression in column 1. These findings show that PAEs 
have a preference for purchasing patents that were issued by lenient examiners.48
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results for patent purchase by practicing firms, 
which stand in sharp contrast with the patterns for PAEs. First, the effects are all 
much smaller in magnitude than in panel A. In the first seven columns of the table, 
the effects are almost all insignificant and are never larger than 2 percent. Second, 
the relationship with examiner leniency does not appear to be robust: it switches 
signs across proxies or specifications. For instance, in the univariate regression in 
column 1 we obtain a precisely estimated zero for the correlation with the change 
in the number of words per claim. The regression coefficient becomes positive and 
statistically significant in specification (9), suggesting that practicing firms may 
have a preference for less lenient examiners, but the coefficient is relatively small 
(3.49 percent). Overall, there appears to be no quantitatively large or statistically 
robust relationship between purchases by practicing firms and examiner leniency.
The fact that only PAEs selectively purchase patents issued by lenient examin-
ers is not consistent with the view that PAEs solve a generic friction in the patent 
market. If PAEs were primarily lowering transaction costs or solving liquidity prob-
lems, there would be no reason for them to selectively purchase patents from lenient 
examiners, who do not affect patent acquisitions by practicing firms. To examine 
whether PAEs may rather be addressing a  patent-specific friction related to the pat-
ent examination process itself, we now investigate the correlates of patent litigation.
47 More lenient examiners tend to reduce the number of claims by less, which means that a higher change in 
the number of claims (in absolute value) reflects higher leniency. In contrast, a more lenient examiner increases the 
number of words per claim by less, i.e., a higher change in the number of words per claim reflects lower leniency.
48 As previously mentioned, the correlations between patent outcomes and specific examiner traits should not be 
interpreted as causal because examiner traits are correlated. To illustrate this point quantitatively, online Appendix 
Table D11 reports the correlations between the examiner’s propensity to grant patents and other observed examiner 
traits. The correlations are substantial and suggest that specific examiner traits cannot be isolated. Despite this lim-
itation, we view panel A of Table 5 as delivering a robust message: all examiner traits that are suggestive of lenient 
behavior (either on the extensive margin, with the grant decision, or on the intensive margin with changes to the 
application during prosecution) correlate with a greater probability of PAE purchase.
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Table 6 presents the results with patent litigation as the outcome. Panel A reports 
the results for patent litigation by PAEs. The patterns are similar to those found in 
Table 5 for PAEs, except that the magnitudes are much larger. Column 1 shows 
that a one standard deviation increase in the examiner effect for the change in the 
number of words per claim implies a 40.5 percent increase in the rate of litigation 
by PAEs. This effect is very large in itself but also relative of the overall examiner 
effects documented in Table 2, according to which the signal standard deviation of 
examiner effects for PAE litigation is 46 percent (although it is imprecisely esti-
mated). This result suggests that a simple proxy for examiner leniency can account 
for most of the relationship between examiner effects and PAE litigation. Moreover, 
the other columns of Table 5 indicate that this pattern is very robust. The other gen-
eral proxies for examiner leniency, the change in the number of claims and the grant 
Table 6—Patent Litigation and Examiner Behavior
Patent litigation by PAE
Leave-one-out examiner effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Patent litigation by PAEs
% change in number of words −0.405 −0.097
 per claim from app to grant (0.083) (0.12)
% change in number of 0.127 0.05
 claims from app to grant (0.067) (0.07)
Grant rate 0.567 0.48
(0.099) (0.14)
Use of Section 101 −0.105 −0.09 0.05
 Ineligible, lack utility (0.077) (0.08) (0.08)
Use of Section 102(a) 0.0178 0.019 0.023
 Prior art exists (0.089) (0.08) (0.082)
Use of Section 103(a) −0.156 −0.176 −0.039
 Obvious invention (0.075) (0.083) (0.08)
Use of Section 112(b) −0.0003 0.102 0.085
 Vague claims (0.079) (0.08) (0.086)
Fixed effects Year by art unit
Observations 274,464 274,537 311,615 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 274,464
Patent litigation by practicing firm
Leave-one-out examiner effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B. Patent litigation by practicing firms 
% change in number of words −0.138 0.017
 per claim from app to grant (0.043) (0.071)
% change in number of 0.022 −0.015
 claims from app to grant (0.031) (0.034)
Grant rate 0.24 0.23
(0.045) (0.067)
Use of Section 101 −0.068 −0.0205 0.005
 Ineligible, lack utility (0.037) (0.0397) (0.04)
Use of Section 102(a) −0.008 0.0150 0.026
 Prior art exists (0.04) (0.0406) (0.04)
Use of Section 103(a) −0.075 −0.0387 0.008
 Obvious invention (0.034) (0.0370) (0.04)
Use of Section 112(b) −0.118 −0.0978 −0.065
 Vague claims (0.032) (0.0366) (0.04)
Fixed effects Year by art unit
Observations 274,464 274,537 311,615 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 311,470 274,464
Notes: The sample is restricted to IT patents. Regressors are standardized by their standard deviations, and coeffi-
cients are expressed as a fraction of the mean of the outcome. Standard errors are clustered by examiners.
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rate, go in the same direction and are larger in magnitude than when considering pat-
ent purchases. Considering the use of the various sections of patent law, we find that 
the section relating to the obviousness of the invention is the most important, but 
the magnitude of the effect is now substantially larger. In the multivariate regression 
including all examiner effects simultaneously in column 9, the patterns still point to 
the role of leniency as the predictive power loads on the grant rate, with a coefficient 
indicating that a one standard deviation increase in the grant rate implies an increase 
in the rate of PAE litigation close to 50 percent.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results for patent litigation by practicing firms, 
which are qualitatively similar to the patterns for PAEs but smaller in magnitude. 
Across all proxies and specifications in this panel, we consistently find that lenient 
patent examiners—who increase the number of words per claim by less, have a 
higher grant rate, and reference patent law less often—issue patents with a higher 
litigation risk. The magnitude of the effects is less strong than for litigation by PAEs 
but is comparable to the magnitude of the effects for purchases by PAEs (panel A 
of Table 5). For instance, a one standard deviation fall in the examiner effect for 
the change in the number of words per claim implies a 13.8 percent increase in the 
rate of litigation by practicing firms and 13.9 percent increase in the rate of PAE 
purchase.
The finding that patent litigation by both practicing firms and PAEs is driven by 
examiner leniency challenges the view that PAEs engage in idiosyncratic, frivo-
lous lawsuits. The merit of the lawsuits involving patents issued by lenient patent 
examiners may be questionable, but PAEs are not the only entities to selectively 
assert patents from lenient examiners—practicing firms do so as well. PAEs pur-
chase patents that are different from those handled by practicing firms in the market 
for patents (Table 5), but their propensity to assert patents issued by lenient exam-
iners is merely a more extreme version of the litigation behavior of practicing firms 
(Table 6).
The patterns in the data are therefore difficult to reconcile with the mainstream 
views of PAEs, either as intermediaries solving a generic friction in the patent mar-
ket or as perpetrators of frivolous lawsuits. Rather, it appears that much of the activ-
ities of PAEs is driven by a specific friction in the patent market, which strongly 
correlates with examiner leniency. Our findings are therefore in line with a nuanced 
view of PAEs, suggesting that PAEs’ activities are the symptom of features of the 
patent system that affect litigation more generally (e.g., Lemley and Melamed 2013 
and Schwartz and Kesan 2014). PAEs behave as litigation experts, and much of their 
activities stem from the way patents are handled by lenient examiners, who affect lit-
igation more generally. Although we can only document correlations with examiner 
traits, we emphasize that the underlying causal examiner effects are  quantitatively 
large and should therefore be accounted for by any convincing theory of PAEs’ 
activities.49
49 Of course, even though the causal examiner effects from Table 2 are large, they do not account for the entirety 
of PAEs’ patent acquisition and assertion behaviors. We only speak to the (substantial) part of PAEs’ activities that 
is caused by examiner effects and point out that the two standard views of PAEs cannot account for these patterns.
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C. PAEs and Patent Invalidity
In this subsection we study whether lenient examiners, who play an important role 
for litigation in general and for litigation by PAEs in particular, tend to issue patents 
that are more likely to be invalid. Various observers (e.g., Federal Trade Commission 
2016) have hypothesized that PAEs may be asserting patents that are “invalid,” in 
the sense that these patents should not have been issued in the first place because 
they do not comply with the standards set by US patent law. Given the evidence that 
patent litigation by PAEs is very strongly correlated with examiner leniency, we 
can  recast this question in terms of examiner effects: do lenient examiners tend to 
issue patent that are more likely to be invalid? Approaching this question in terms 
of examiner effects has the potential to be informative about PAEs but also about 
patent litigation by practicing firms, since they also selectively assert patents that 
were issued by lenient examiners.
Proxies for Patent Invalidity.—Patent invalidity is notoriously difficult to mea-
sure because of selection effects (e.g., Miller 2013). To assess whether a robust 
relationship exists between examiner leniency and patent invalidity, we rely on three 
complementary proxies for patent invalidity. We consider two restricted samples to 
study two common proxies for patent invalidity, which are subject to substantial 
sample selection but standard in the literature. We also introduce a third proxy avail-
able in the full sample of granted patents.
First, for a small number of cases, patent litigation does not result in a settlement, 
and a court trial closes the case (see Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz 2014 for a 
review). We obtain this data from LexMachina. The sample of cases for which trial 
outcomes are available is very selected: in our main analysis sample, there are only 
516 cases with information on whether the court deemed the patent invalid or found 
an infringement.
The second common proxy for patent invalidity is a procedure for challenging the 
validity of a patent at the USPTO, known as an “inter partes review” (IPR). IPRs 
were introduced in 2012 as a defensive tool for those seeking to defeat meritless 
infringement claims (see Chien and Helmers 2015 for a review). The procedure can 
be initiated by any party other than the patent owner and requires the patent office to 
review the validity of the patent based on specific sections of patent law. This sample 
is also very selected: there are 989 IPR cases in our main analysis sample.
Third, we use patent  re-issuance requests as another proxy for patent inva-
lidity. A  reissue application can be filed by the applicant “whenever any patent 
is, through error, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.”50 We obtain 
this information from the continuation data in the Patent Examination Research 
50 Patent law states that “Whenever any patent is, through error, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, 
by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a 
right to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee required by 
law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended 
application, for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent” (35 U.S.C. 251(a)).  Reissue applications can 
petition for an increase in the scope of claims only if they are filed within two years from grant of the original patent 
(35 U.S.C. 251(d)). We repeat our analysis considering only  reissue applications beyond this threshold to establish 
that attempts to increase claim scope are not driving the patterns.
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Dataset.  Reissue applications are a useful metric for our purposes, as they are 
available for all granted patents and provide a direct measure of examiner mis-
takes from the perspective of the patent applicant.
Table 7 reports summary statistics on our proxies for patent invalidity. Court 
rulings are observed for only 516 patents, or about 0.0004 percent of our sample. 
Conditional on observing a court ruling, the rate of invalidity is close to 19 percent. 
In 31.9 percent of cases, the court declares that the patent is infringed, which indi-
rectly attests to its validity. The panel also indicates that an IPR procedure is filed 
for 0.0003 percent of patents. Conditional on filing, 78.5 percent of IPRs are “insti-
tuted,” meaning that the patent office deems it likely that the patent is at least in part 
invalid.51 Because the “institution” rate of IPRs is very high, close to 80 percent, 
either the occurrence of an IPR or the institution of an IPR can be used as proxies 
for patent invalidity. For both court rulings and IPRs, the invalidity rates appear to 
be high, but they are observed conditional on a stringent form of sample selection.
Finally, Table 7 shows that  reissue applications are submitted for about 0.002 per-
cent of patents. According to patent law, a  reissue application indicates that the 
applicant believes that the patent is wholly or in part invalid because of a mistake 
in the document. To address the potential concern that some applicants may vio-
late patent law and strategically exploit  reissue applications to obtain greater scope, 
instead of correcting a mistake, we consider  reissue applications that are submit-
ted more than two years after grant. After the  two-year delay,  reissue applications 
 cannot petition for an increase in scope; they account for about 0.0004 percent of all 
granted patents. This fraction is very small, but it is comparable in magnitude to the 
number of observations for court rulings and IPRs and has the advantage of being 
available for the full sample of granted patents.
Results.—We run specification (8) with our patent invalidity proxies as out-
comes. The regressors are examiner effects for the change in the number of words 
per claim and the grant rate, which were the most powerful univariate predictors of 
patent acquisition and assertion by PAEs in Tables 5 and 6. We also consider the best 
linear predictor for patent purchase by PAEs using the specification in column 9 of 
Table 5. The results are reported in Table 8.
51 According to patent law, “An inter partes review may be instituted upon a showing that there is a reason-
able likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged” (35 U.S.C. Ch. 31, 
§311–§319).
Table 7—Summary Statistics on Proxies for Patent Invalidity
Mean Median SD Sample size
Rate of invalidity decision by court, conditional on ruling 0.1880 0 0.3911 516
Rate of infringement decision by court, conditional on ruling 0.3198 0 0.4668 516
Rate of IPR filing 0.0003 0 0.0164 1,833,464
Rate of IPR institution, conditional on IPR filing 0.7858 1 0.4105 719
Rate of re-issuance 0.0020 0 0.0458 1,833,464
Rate of re-issuance more than two years after grant 0.0004 0 0.0206 1,833,464
Notes: This table reports summary statistics on several proxies for patent invalidity. See Section IIIC for variable 
definitions and Section IA for information on the sample. 
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We find a very strong and robust relationship between examiner leniency and our 
preferred proxy for patent invalidity, the re-issuance of granted patents. Panel A of 
Table 8 reports this finding. The various rows of this panel correspond to separate uni-
variate regressions. The first row of column 1 indicates that, conditional on year fixed 
effects, a one standard deviation increase in the examiner effect for the change in the 
number of words per claim (i.e., less leniency) leads to a 26 percent decline in the 
probability of re-issuance. Columns 2 and 3 show that the coefficient is very stable as 
art unit by year fixed effects and art unit by year by technology class fixed effects are 
introduced. Similarly strong and robust patterns are documented in the other rows of 
the tables for the grant rate and the linear predictor for PAE acquisition. Columns 4 
to 6 show that the patterns are even stronger when we consider the re-issuance rate 
two years or more after grant, the delay beyond which a re-issuance request cannot 
petition for an increase in the scope of the claims. For instance, the coefficient for the 
change in the number of words per claim hovers between 55 percent and 61 percent 
across specifications. Since PAEs selectively assert patents granted by lenient exam-
iner (more so than practicing firms), they are more likely to assert patents that are 
likely to contain mistakes, as reflected by the re-issuance rates.
Panel B of Table 8 shows that common proxies for patent invalidity based on court 
rulings cannot deliver conclusive results due to data limitations. For a small  subsample 
of litigated patents, we observe rulings in which the courts may indicate that the pat-
ent is invalid (columns 1 to 3) or that an infringement is found (columns 4 to 6). The 
various regression coefficients reported in this panel show that with such proxies the 
research design is  underpowered, regardless of the set of fixed effects. The points esti-
mates switch signs across specifications and are very imprecisely estimated.
Panel C of Table 8 uses IPR occurrence and IPR institution as proxies for patent 
invalidity from the perspective of the Patent Office. Columns 1 to 3 of panel C of 
Table 8 document that examiner leniency is a very strong predictor of the occur-
rence of an IPR. For instance, the first row of column 2 indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in examiner effects for the change in the number of words per 
claims (lower leniency) implies a 41 percent fall in the probability of an IPR. The 
regression coefficients are all large and very stable across specifications that include 
different sets of fixed effects. In contrast, columns 4 to 6 do not deliver conclusive 
results regarding IPR institution, because the selected sample of patents that go 
through an IPR is too small to provide adequate power.
In sum, Table 8 indicates that, when using suitable proxies for patent invalidity 
that do not suffer from small sample issues, there is strong and robust evidence 
that lenient examiners issue patents that are more likely to be invalid. These exam-
iners account for a disproportionate share of patent litigation, in particular by 
PAEs. This finding indicates that examiner behavior during patent prosecution 
is a  quantitatively important determinant of patent invalidity, suggesting that PAEs 
 specialize in purchasing and asserting patents that should not have been issued as 
such in light of the standards set by current patent law.52
52 This finding does not speak conclusively to the welfare effects of PAEs, because litigation of patents issued 
by lenient examiners could conceivably be socially valuable, even when these patents are deemed invalid by current 
patent law. The standards set by current patent law are often motivated by economic ideas of welfare maximization 
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D. PAEs and the European Patent Office
To further understand the nature of patents purchased by PAEs, we analyze grant 
decisions for patents that were simultaneously filed at both the EPO and USPTO. 
As discussed in the literature (e.g, Picard and Van Pottelsberghe 2011), the EPO has 
(e.g., the recent Supreme Court decision in Alice v. CLS Bank cites economic literature on sequential innovation) 
but may not actually be socially optimal.
Table 8—Examiner Behavior and Likelihood of Patent Invalidity
Leave-one-out examiner effects Re-issuance rate
Re-issuance rate 
two years or more after grant
(separate regressions) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Re-issuance of granted patents
Percent change in number of words −0.26 −0.24 −0.25 −0.55 −0.57 −0.61
 per claim from app to grant (0.07) (0.06) (0.068) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Grant rate 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.54 0.53 0.54
(0.06) (0.06) (0.061) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Linear predictor for PAE acquisition 0.139 0.136 0.142 0.24 0.26 0.27
(0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.079) (0.075) (0.078)
Fixed effects Year Year by 
art unit
Year by 
art unit 
by class
Year Year by 
art unit
Year by 
art unit 
by class
Observations 274,464 273,839
Leave-one-out examiner effects Invalidity rate Infringement rate
(separate regressions) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B. Court rulings
Percent change in number of words 0.02 0.068 0.11 −0.01 −0.0001 −0.0002
 per claim from app to grant (0.06) (0.29) (0.32) (0.06) (0.24) (0.28)
Grant rate 0.02 −0.039 −0.019 −0.03 0.06 −0.12
(0.03) (0.26) (0.54) (0.03) (0.10) (0.22)
Linear predictor for PAE acquisition −0.057 −0.031 −0.069 0.01 −0.007 0.007
(0.044) (0.19) (0.19) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15)
Fixed effects Year Year by 
art unit
Year by 
art unit 
by class
Year Year by 
art unit
Year by 
art unit 
by class
Observations 111 111
Leave-one-out examiner effects IPR rate Institution rate of IPR
(separate regressions) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C. Trials at the patent office (“inter partes reviews”)
Percent change in number of words −0.38 −0.43 −0.42 −0.03 −0.05 −0.23
 per claim from app to grant (0.098) (0.094) (0.087) (0.057) (0.27) (0.29)
Grant rate 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.05 −0.03 −0.034
(0.085) (0.081) (0.082) (0.047) (0.11) (0.13)
Linear predictor for PAE acquisition 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.024 0.089 0.21
(0.088) (0.086) (0.077) (0.04) (0.21) (0.26)
Fixed effects Year Year by 
art unit
Year by 
art unit 
by class
Year Year by 
art unit
Year by 
art unit 
by class
Observations 274,537 180
Notes: The sample is restricted to IT patents. Regressors are standardized by their standard deviations, and coeffi-
cients are expressed as a fraction of the mean of the outcome. The linear predictor for PAE acquisition is given by 
specification (9) in Table 5. Standard errors are clustered by examiners.
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a stricter inventive step requirement for patentability.53 We use the grant decision at 
the EPO as an indicator for the magnitude of the inventive step of the correspond-
ing US patent. The methodology for building the  joint-filing dataset is described in 
online Appendix C.54
We find that PAEs are much more likely to purchase patents that were rejected 
by the EPO, suggesting that PAEs target patents covering more incremental, less 
innovative technology. Table 9 reports the results. In column 1, we find that EPO 
grant is negatively correlated with patent purchase by PAEs, controlling for art unit 
by year fixed effects. In column 2, we add examiner fixed effects that control for fac-
tors such as specialization and other examiner behaviors that may affect the patent. 
The negative relationship remains: even within the portfolio of a given examiner, 
PAEs are more likely to purchase patents that are rejected at the EPO. This find-
ing suggests that PAEs target more incremental, less innovative technologies. It is 
therefore plausible that patents purchased by PAEs are particularly productive for 
 litigation, both because they are closer to existing intellectual property than average 
(given the small step size revealed by EPO rejections) and because their claims may 
be less  well defined and harder to interpret than average (given the examiners who 
granted them).55
E. Robustness Checks and Additional Results
In the final part of this section, we discuss the robustness of our PAE results 
across samples, specifications, and PAE types. In addition, we use data on patent 
value and auction prices to shed further light on PAE behavior.
53 Note that the EPO’s patentability standards are not necessarily closer to the social optimum.
54 We focus on  non-continuation patent applications that were filed at both the EPO and USPTO within half a 
year. The sample covers about  one-sixth of granted  non-continuation patents in the United States.
55 In additional breakdowns reported in online Appendix Table D12, we find that the relationship between EPO 
decisions and PAEs’ purchase decisions is driven specifically by the set of patents granted by examiners with a large 
causal impact on PAE purchases.
Table 9—Patent Acquisition by PAEs and Grant Decisions 
at the European Patent Office (EPO)
Patent purchase by PAE
(1) (2)
EPO grant −0.211 −0.199
(0.057) (0.059)
Art unit by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Examiner fixed effects No Yes
Observations 218,867 217,491
Notes: This table examines whether PAEs selectively purchase higher quality patents, using 
patent grant decisions at the EPO as a proxy for patent quality (as in Lei and Wright 2017 and 
Picard and Van Pottelsberghe 2011). Regressors are standardized by their standard deviations, 
and regression coefficients are expressed as a fraction of the mean of the outcome. The sample 
includes all patents that were jointly filed at the USPTO and EPO, as described in Section IIID. 
Standard errors are clustered by examiners.
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Robustness across Samples and Specifications.—Table 10 documents the robust-
ness of the signal standard deviations of examiner effects for PAE purchases across 
alternative specifications and subsamples. Row A reports the baseline estimate in 
our main analysis sample, as in Table 2. Row B shows that the signal standard devi-
ation remains similar when introducing assignee fixed effects in equation (1): PAEs 
selectively purchase patents coming from specific examiners even within the portfo-
lio of a given assignee. Rows C to E show that the signal standard deviation is very 
similar across PAE lists. Row C reports similar estimates when excluding from the 
sample the patents purchased by the largest PAE, Intellectual Ventures. Conversely, 
row D shows that the results are comparable when considering only patents pur-
chased by Intellectual Ventures.56 The estimates also remain stable when using the 
list of PAEs defined by Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz (2014), as shown in row E.
Moreover, online Appendix Table D13 shows that the relationships between pat-
ent outcomes and examiner traits are similar when repeating the estimation using the 
“busyness instrument” methodology introduced in Section IIC.
Results by PAE Type.—Existing research has hypothesized that large and small 
PAEs may behave differently (Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz 2014). Row F of Table 
10 shows that PAEs with a small portfolio of patents, as defined by Cotropia, Kesan, 
and Schwartz (2014), are as responsive to examiner effects as the average PAE. 
Another plausible hypothesis is that PAEs that primarily work with small firms or indi-
vidual inventors may have a different behavior with respect to examiners, for instance 
because they may be focused on addressing frictions that specifically affect these firms 
56 The estimates reported in rows C and D do not average out to the estimate in row A, implying that there is 
not as much covariance between the two outcomes (purchase by Intellectual Ventures and purchase by a PAE other 
than Intellectual Ventures) as there is within outcomes. This result indicates that there is some segmentation of the 
market between PAEs, and that examiner effects are strong everywhere.
Table 10—Heterogeneity in Examiner Causal Effects on Patent Acquisition by PAEs
Signal standard 
deviation, percent 
of average
Average 
purchase rate 
(percent)
(A) Baseline 63.0 1.02
(B) Including assignee fixed effects 44.5 1.02
(C) Excluding Intellectual Ventures 82.7 0.55
(D) Intellectual Ventures only 82.0 0.47
(E) PAE list from Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz (2014) 67.8 0.60
(F) Small PAEs 40.7 0.07
(G) PAEs purchasing from small entities/unassigned patents 70.8 0.11
Notes: This table reports the signal standard deviation of examiner effects using different specifications and PAE 
outcomes, using the full sample. The Bayesian shrinkage methodology used to obtain these estimates is presented 
in Section IIA. Row (A) reports the baseline estimate from Table 2. In row (B), the specification includes assignee 
fixed effects. Row (C) uses purchase by a PAE other than Intellectual Ventures as the outcome. Row (D) considers 
purchases by Intellectual Ventures as the outcome. Row (E) uses the PAEs list from Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz 
(2014). Row (F) examines purchases by PAEs with a small patent portfolio, as identified by Cotropia, Kesan, 
and Schwartz (2014). Row (G) considers purchases by PAEs whose portfolios have more than 50 percent of patents 
that either were unassigned (i.e., the inventor is the owner) or that were assigned to a firm that the USPTO classi-
fies as a small entity.
176 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS JANUARY 2020
and inventors. Row G considers a subset of PAEs that bought over 50 percent of their 
patents from small entities.57 In this subsample as well, the signal standard deviation 
is very similar to the baseline.
Next, Figure 4 investigates whether different types of PAEs react differently 
to examiner leniency. Using specification (8), this figure reports the correlation 
between PAE purchase rates and the main proxy for examiner leniency from Section 
IIIB, the change in the number of words per claim between application and grant. 
We consider in turn Intellectual Ventures, all PAEs but Intellectual Ventures, small 
PAEs, and PAEs that purchased over 50 percent of their patents from small entities. 
We find that they all selectively purchase patents from more lenient examiners, with 
57 We define patents from small entities as patents that either were unassigned (i.e., the inventor is the owner) 
or that were assigned to a firm that the USPTO classifies as a “small entity” (if there is an assignee, each patent 
reports whether it was initially assigned to a small entity, i.e., a small firm). On average, PAEs purchase only 15.7 
percent of their patents from small firms (19 percent when excluding continuation applications). Likewise, the 
share of unassigned patents in PAEs’ purchases is low, ranging from 6.2 percent when including continuations to 
10.7 percent without continuations. These low shares are difficult to reconcile with the view that the typical PAE is 
addressing frictions that specifically affect small firms or individual inventors.
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Figure 4. Heterogeneity in Patent Acquisition Behavior across Groups of PAEs
Notes: The sample is restricted to IT patents. The regression coefficients indicate the percentage change in the prob-
ability of PAE acquisition (relative to the baseline rate) for a one standard deviation increase in the examiner effect 
for the change in the number of words per claim during prosecution. The methodology is described in Section IIIB 
(see specification (8)). Regression coefficients are reported separately for four samples of PAEs: Intellectual 
Ventures, PAEs other than Intellectual Ventures, PAEs with a small patent portfolio according to the classification 
of Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz (2014), and PAEs that primarily buy patents from small entities (specifically, as 
described in the main text, they purchase more than half of their patents from small firms or individual inventors). 
The 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered by examiners.
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relationships of very similar magnitudes across PAE groups.58 The  leniency bias of 
PAEs is therefore a very stable feature.
Patent Value and Transaction Prices.—Finally, to shed further light on the conse-
quences of lenient examination, we consider data on the private value and transac-
tion prices of the patents granted by lenient examiners.
First, we find that these examiners do not create greater private value for pat-
ent holders, suggesting a distinction between breadth and vagueness of claims. We 
might expect that lenient examiners are creating value for the applicant by approving 
the language that the applicant wanted. However, online Appendix Table D14 shows 
a small and statistically insignificant relationship between examiner PAE effect and 
examiner private value effect, as measured by stock market response.59 This result 
suggests that these examiners are not simply granting patents with greater scope, 
which should create higher private value. A potential explanation is that the patents 
they grant contain less  well-defined or vaguer language, which is consistent with the 
negative relationship between Section 112(b) blocking action usage and  non-PAE 
litigation shown in panel B of Table D7.60
Second, we analyze patent transaction prices for a subset of patents where data is 
available. Having complete transaction price data would give us additional insight 
into the value of patents purchased by PAEs, but such data is generally not available. 
Here, we make use of data on a selected set of patents purchased in patent auctions. 
We find evidence that patents issued by more lenient examiners tend to sell at a 
lower price (online Appendix Figure D4).
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that examiner effects have a large impact on sev-
eral patent outcomes (conditional on grant), which suggests that significant het-
erogeneity in patent outcomes results from the process of creation of patent rights 
and is independent of technical merit. Our analysis leveraged the allocation of 
patent applications to examiners as a source of  quasi-random variation in patent 
rights. To address identification concerns, we accounted for potential examiner 
specialization within narrow technology categories by developing new sources of 
 quasi-experimental variation, based on assignment mechanisms at the patent office 
related to patent application serial numbers and examiner busyness. We also used 
flexible controls to address the potential concern that our results may be driven by 
selection effects stemming from the decision to grant a patent, rather than by patent 
crafting. These techniques could be used to investigate a host of issues related to the 
crafting of patent rights in future research.
58 The results are similar with other proxies for examiner leniency, such as the grant rate, as well as when con-
sidering the full sample of patents instead of IT patents only (not reported).
59 A caveat here is that the analysis only covers publicly traded firms, that is, the data is not informative about 
whether smaller firms benefit from examiner leniency.
60 Section 112(b) is typically used to clarify indefinite claims language. Under a simple model, there would 
only be litigation in equilibrium if there is disagreement between parties, which would not happen if claims were 
broad but clear.
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We have also shown that examiner effects are particularly important for under-
standing a central and  much-debated feature of the US innovation system, the activ-
ities of PAEs. We found that PAEs selectively purchase and litigate patents issued 
by “lenient” examiners; these examiners tend to issue patents that are more likely 
to be litigated, but not purchased, by practicing firms. These patterns are quanti-
tatively large and cannot be accounted for by standard PAE theories that describe 
PAEs either as intermediaries solving a generic friction in the patent market (such 
as transaction costs and illiquidity) or as perpetrators of frivolous lawsuits. Instead, 
we found that the activities of PAEs are best characterized as a response to a specific 
friction in the patent system that is caused by the way lenient examiners handle pat-
ent rights and affects litigation more broadly.
These findings imply that policies affecting the behaviors of patent examiners, 
and more specifically of lenient examiners, have the potential to greatly affect 
PAEs, but also litigation by practicing firms (for instance, in recent years patent 
litigation has been a major concern for smartphone manufacturers, including Apple 
and Samsung). Our results provide support for a recent policy effort at the USPTO 
aimed at improving examiner resources, tools, and training (the Enhanced Patent 
Quality Initiative was enacted in 2015). HR policies at the patent office have been 
the focus of an emerging academic literature (e.g., Frakes and Wasserman 2017 and 
Tabakovic and Wollmann 2018) and could serve as a useful complement to other 
recent policies that have started curbing PAEs’ activities, including the introduction 
of inter partes reviews and recent Supreme Court rulings (e.g., Alice v. CLS Bank).
In future work, it would be instructive to investigate whether it is socially effi-
cient to enforce patents issued by lenient examiners. Even if lenient examiners issue 
patents that are not socially valuable per se, there may still be potential spillovers to 
other patents from the enforcement activity. For example, PAEs’ activities may deter 
infringement of all patents, not just patents of the types they choose to enforce directly. 
More broadly, our findings call for a greater focus on understanding the impact of the 
crafting of patent rights on innovation dynamics. This paper provides a set of tools to 
conduct such investigation and has shown the explanatory power and potential policy 
relevance of this line of inquiry in the context of the debate over PAEs.
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